IN THE ANATOMY OF PSUV Zulia
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero / Historian
El Zulia is the primary federal entity of Venezuela, not only by the oil issue, including its political aggregate. A geographical area that shares a slice of the more than 2,200-mile border with Colombia and also brings together a significant voting population - about 2,082,916 registered voters, who represent nearly 15% of the country's electoral universe. Historically, the Zulia state has had an uneven performance in relation to the national country, the explanation of this fact must be viewed in a broader context of building a historical identity associated with the port city's past and assuming a differential anthropology. That mixed with pride differentiality identity has been a political weapon used by the opposition to Chavez in the region.
Chavismo has been a political force characterized by its dispersion in the state. Since its inception in 1997, formed a box of some personal leadership so still survive: the likes of Professor Mary Queipo an important activity at the University of Zulia, Silvestre Villalobos, Jorge Duran Centeno (current ambassador to Panama), are just some characterizations of the political personality. In general, even before the organization of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) could not speak of a well structured organization in Zulia. Precisely this gap is what explains the low probability that had the late Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) to take political power.
The internal conflict reflect a weakness in the regional leadership of the forces of Chavez and foreshadow the problems that Marxist theorists spoke referring to the need for a well-structured game. Following Antonio Gramsci, Chavez has not been able to become a hegemonic power bloc internal scattering. However, it should be pointed out that since 2006 the victory of Chavez in presidential elections has been observed an organizational effort that resulted in the formation of a proposal that tends to bring together the various political processes that develop in the region . The formation of the PSUV has matched the various trends that survive the initial Chavez: the military, which is represented in the figure Durán Centeno and military groups who participated in the 1992 coup attempt, the left represented by historical figures such as José Huerta, Emilio Chirico, Arnoldo Olivares and others who come from a militant and active participation in organizations that were opposed to the AD and COPEI forces in the region ; the university embodied by figures like Maria Queipo, Mario Isea, Rodrigo Cabezas and others that are so important to the university movement in the late 80's and 90 of the last century, and finally those sectors that were adding their from efforts to link Chavez to Arias Cárdenas, including himself should be noted Gian Carlo Di Martino. These forces coexist
with differences and dissimilar perspectives on the dynamics of building the party and how to articulate the people's power, but they agreed on the need to organize around the PSUV seeking thereby to build a historic bloc in the Gramscian sense of the term, allowing them to be able to specify an option of the Bolivarian project progress in Zulia.
Chavismo has progressed - with ups and downs in regional electoral strength. In 2006, obtained a total of 724,254 votes, beating the candidate Manuel Rosales in his own field. That figure is significant the impact of personal leadership and charismatic Hugo Chávez, especially when compared with votes por el chavismo en el año 2005 en las elecciones al parlamento nacional cuando a través de la UVE y el MVR obtuvieron algo más de 350.000. Sin embargo, el año 2007 reflejo la debilidad estructural y organizativa del recién creado PSUV pues en la consulta del referendo por la Reforma Constitucional del 2 de diciembre obtuvo 472.462 votos en la opción del Bloque A y 467.958 en la del Bloque B, reduciéndose su caudal electoral. Los efectos del referendo del 2-D se sintieron en la conformación de los liderazgos internos del partido. Figuras como Rodrigo Cabezas – Ministro de Finanzas en su momento-, Gian Carlo Di Martino (Alcalde de Maracaibo), Gral. Carlos Martínez Mendoza (Presidente CORPOZULIA) comenzaron a disputarse un espacio power internally.
The outcome of this dispute was the triumph of Di Martino's candidacy for governor and displaced internally Rodrigo Cabezas, leading to his replacement as Vice-President of the PSUV in the Zulia-Falcon region. The results of the gubernatorial election in November 2008 and the subsequent defeat of the option Di Martino, reopened to the ideological divide within the party. Electorally, the Vice-President of the PSUV, Jackie Farias, has had to endure the presence of former mayor and discontent generated toward certain sectors, but at the same time you can not deny that succeeded in raising the party's vote to 658,724 votes. This electoral base, that fails to ratify an internal leadership, explains the dilemma that the PSUV is now: 1) restructuring its power base through new primary election or 2) is organized around the leadership of Farias-Di Martino. Both options have risks: the 1st, can lead to internal schism, given the survival of individual differences in the game, however you can create the basis for a re-legitimization of popular organization, the 2nd option may end up increasing fragmentation existing and some disorganization. Process
After November, the trend is favored Rodrigo Cabezas. The proximity to the mayors of Mara, Páez, Padilla, Cabimas, Columbus, San Francisco and other winners of the regional elections, keeps alive the figure of former Prime Minister and placed in a difficult internal situation the followers of Di Martino. There is no direct confrontation, but certainly in the internal forces are mobilized to resolve its political leadership in the party.
All that scenario, should be structured on the urgent need for the PSUV to build an information matrix as to minimize the media campaign built by Manuel Rosales and his advisers, where they have to embody the meaning and significance of Zulia. If the PSUV is not able to develop a discourse that identifies with the political possibilities regional image are minimized and thus, the internal differences are not corrected. The recent dispute over port and airport of Maracaibo is a political opportunity to set the course for the future of the PSUV, if the party manages to survive and weakening regional sentiments Rosales in his leadership, we will see the emergence of a new political leadership strategy would allow Chavez and his forces take the city of Zulia, but everything is subject to the actions of the PSUV and their ability to articulate coherently.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero historian, political analyst
Juane1208@gmail.com
20/03/2009
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