CHAVEZ AND THE END OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
CHAVEZ AND THE END OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
The recent tour of Europe points to an aspect of geopolitics in Latin America which had highlighted some items. It is the culmination of the Monroe Doctrine in the geographical context of Latin America and their implications for the U.S. and the rest of the countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean.
As is well known, James Monroe U.S. President between 1817-1825 made these lines of action the U.S. government that are summarized in three measures: 1) refusal to permit further European colonization in America, 2) abstaining from the U.S. in the affairs of Europe and 3) no involvement of European governments in Latin America. These three actions are translated and supplemented by the U.S. territorial expansion, mainly at the expense of Mexican territory, the Louisiana Purchase to France and the acquisition of Florida to Spain with them the U.S. is heading into the consolidation of hegemony in region that has been diminished in recent years.
The government of George W. Bush has chosen to have a higher priority for other geographical areas, forced the so-called "growing older" (Asia Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East) where interest is related to the subject oil and that has allowed it to intervene in two of the largest energy reserves in the world (Afghanistan and Iraq.) However, that choice has had its geopolitical costs, manifested in the introduction of European and Asian capital for strategic investments in vital economic areas, mainly associated with natural resource of great geopolitical (coal, oil, gas, ports, roads communication). Accompanying this process, we found an institutional dynamics of emergence of new type of oil nationalism in Latin America, mainly marked a historical consciousness of the geopolitical significance of energy resources available to them. Governments like Chavez in Venezuela, Lula in Brazil, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, have raised the banner of defending the oil resources and have used it to achieve greater economic benefits for its citizens.
These principles of defending the sovereignty of energy, have clashed with the American claim to hold a space for intervention by the action taken by the Colombian armed forces, which have been laboratory application of the so-called revolution in military hardware (RAM ), which results in the use of Advances in science and technology in the military. This imbalance caused by Colombia in its military and strategic partnership with the U.S. has led to a rapprochement with other centers of world architecture and world-system, particularly with countries like Russia and China, who have an interest in access to joint exploitation of oil and gases, and have also provided military advice and support to our country and others in the area. The result of this modification of the traditional area of \u200b\u200bU.S. intervention, coupled with the rise of nationalistic policies framed countries has resulted in the completion of the Monroe Doctrine.
As part of that conclusion, Chavez's government ahead of closer ties with other strategic areas worldwide. Contact and strategic alliance with Russia and China (which in turn have trade links with Brazil and Brazil with us), to generate joint projects that result in increased investment in these countries in areas related to oil and gas coupled with the increasing integration of European countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy) in the creation of joint exploitation of oil exploration and refining. Do not forget that to the extent that the certification is produced heavy oil in the Orinoco belt, which brings us to a potential than the 270,000 million barrels of oil (about 25% of world reserves, surpassing Saudi Arabia has 180,000 million million), our country becomes more strategic significance. These partnerships, which just signed a foundation placed over the burial of the dominant hegemony of the U.S. in the region and open new spaces for the development of independent political and South-South integration. In this context it should be seen Chavez's tour to Europe. Witnessing a moment in the new global architecture to be followed very carefully.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero Universidad del Zulia
Juane1208@gmail.com Historian 28/07/2008
Monday, April 12, 2010
What's The Meaning Of The Rave Bracelets
ELECTORAL DIVISION
constituencies in Zulia 2010.
The National Electoral Council (CNE) by applying what was approved by the Organic Law of Electoral Processes (LOPE) announced the new constituencies in the country. Is excited with the apparent diversity of criteria used to trace those circuits, but without going into too much detail is a political move designed to maintain the hegemony - in the Gramscian sense, the PSUV in the National Assembly.
As always, the opposition has kicked, protested, has been altered to no avail, that they -. demonstrates once more the huge political mistake committed by not attend the 2005 electoral process, under the false allegation that was not going to reach almost no representation in the Assembly. Remind comical conceit of his argument, by an exercise of historical memory: in 1988, the Radical Cauda reached only three (3) deputies in national legislative elections - Aristobulus, Pablo Medina and Andres Velasquez, no doubt, was a negligible contrast with the clear majority of AD and COPEI. The three deputies, made such a noise, generated an alternative agenda so important that in the 1993 elections came to have almost 30 members. This shows the falsity of the argument and the possibility that a dissident group of members may seek.
The decision of the CNE, will have its impact on the Zulia, but this result apart from the fact the historical analysis of voting behavior in the constituencies should be viewed in two important parameters: 1) establishing a political agenda designed to address voting preferences the voters and 2) the direct democratic election of future representatives. I think that we should not allow and in that we include the CNE, that there are no internal elections as stipulated in the Constitution, that process is key at this critical juncture.
Both parameters can make the raw results to present - based on the vote of 2008 - to be or not trends some in the election of 2010. As is known, the circuit No. 1 was composed of the Municipalities Rosario de Perija Semprún Machiques and Jesus Maria, in 2008 the PSUV Machiques victory in Rosario and Jesus Maria Semprun. In the 2nd first municipalities with very narrow margin and more in the past. This presumes that the PSUV is awarded the deputy in the circuit, taking into account the two variables we noted initially. The circuit 2 is composed of Jesus Enrique Lossada and La Cañada de Urdaneta. In Lossada won Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) and La Cañada the PSUV, however Lossada voting population is over and everything seems to suggest that UNT wins. The circuit 3, formed by Paez, Mara Almirante Padilla and allows us to say - no doubt "that the PSUV is imposed. Circuit 4, which includes the parishes of Maracaibo as Venancio Pulgar, Ildefonso Vasquez and Antonio Borjas Romero in all of them won the PSUV and hopefully to be repeated. The circuit 5, which includes the parishes Coquivacoa, Olegario and Juana de Avila, UNT almost certainly will.
The circuit 6, which form Raúl Leoni, Carraciolo Parra, Chiquinquirá, Bolivar and Santa Lucia has historically been controlled by UNT and no chance to alter that outcome. The circuit 7, Cacique Mara, Cecilio Acosta and Cristo de Aranza also be of UNT. The circuit 8, which includes San Isidro, Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, Luis Hurtado Higuera, and Manuel Dagnino must win the PSUV.
circuit 9, which includes only San Francisco must win the PSUV due to the effects of the actions of the Mayor and the organization has attempted. The circuit 10, of Miranda, Santa Rita and Cabimas should be hotly contested, because UNT is strong in Santa Rita and it joined in Cabimas can reverse the incidence of votes of Miranda, I think the PSUV can lose depending on the circuit the quality of the Member who proposed UNT. Circuit 11, Simón Bolívar, Lagunillas, Valmore Rodriguez and Baralt, then by the nature and impact of Lagunillas votes - more than 41000 - must win UNT although the PSUV should get more votes and Valmore Baralt Rodríguez. Circuit 12, Catatumbo, Colon, Francisco Javier Pulgar and Sucre, the PSUV must triumph in Columbus, Francisco Javier Pulgar and Catatumbo with what would the deputy.
As we see the sum would give 5 for UNT and partners, while the PSUV would get seven (7). Constituencies would be defined by list and it is hoped that the Indian MP gets the PSUV. That would mean that the best the PSUV would get eight (8) Members and UNT circuits could win lists. Again it all depends on the quality of candidates and their political agenda. However, it is proposed a scenario analysis interesting, we'll see
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
27/01/2010.
constituencies in Zulia 2010.
The National Electoral Council (CNE) by applying what was approved by the Organic Law of Electoral Processes (LOPE) announced the new constituencies in the country. Is excited with the apparent diversity of criteria used to trace those circuits, but without going into too much detail is a political move designed to maintain the hegemony - in the Gramscian sense, the PSUV in the National Assembly.
As always, the opposition has kicked, protested, has been altered to no avail, that they -. demonstrates once more the huge political mistake committed by not attend the 2005 electoral process, under the false allegation that was not going to reach almost no representation in the Assembly. Remind comical conceit of his argument, by an exercise of historical memory: in 1988, the Radical Cauda reached only three (3) deputies in national legislative elections - Aristobulus, Pablo Medina and Andres Velasquez, no doubt, was a negligible contrast with the clear majority of AD and COPEI. The three deputies, made such a noise, generated an alternative agenda so important that in the 1993 elections came to have almost 30 members. This shows the falsity of the argument and the possibility that a dissident group of members may seek.
The decision of the CNE, will have its impact on the Zulia, but this result apart from the fact the historical analysis of voting behavior in the constituencies should be viewed in two important parameters: 1) establishing a political agenda designed to address voting preferences the voters and 2) the direct democratic election of future representatives. I think that we should not allow and in that we include the CNE, that there are no internal elections as stipulated in the Constitution, that process is key at this critical juncture.
Both parameters can make the raw results to present - based on the vote of 2008 - to be or not trends some in the election of 2010. As is known, the circuit No. 1 was composed of the Municipalities Rosario de Perija Semprún Machiques and Jesus Maria, in 2008 the PSUV Machiques victory in Rosario and Jesus Maria Semprun. In the 2nd first municipalities with very narrow margin and more in the past. This presumes that the PSUV is awarded the deputy in the circuit, taking into account the two variables we noted initially. The circuit 2 is composed of Jesus Enrique Lossada and La Cañada de Urdaneta. In Lossada won Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) and La Cañada the PSUV, however Lossada voting population is over and everything seems to suggest that UNT wins. The circuit 3, formed by Paez, Mara Almirante Padilla and allows us to say - no doubt "that the PSUV is imposed. Circuit 4, which includes the parishes of Maracaibo as Venancio Pulgar, Ildefonso Vasquez and Antonio Borjas Romero in all of them won the PSUV and hopefully to be repeated. The circuit 5, which includes the parishes Coquivacoa, Olegario and Juana de Avila, UNT almost certainly will.
The circuit 6, which form Raúl Leoni, Carraciolo Parra, Chiquinquirá, Bolivar and Santa Lucia has historically been controlled by UNT and no chance to alter that outcome. The circuit 7, Cacique Mara, Cecilio Acosta and Cristo de Aranza also be of UNT. The circuit 8, which includes San Isidro, Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, Luis Hurtado Higuera, and Manuel Dagnino must win the PSUV.
circuit 9, which includes only San Francisco must win the PSUV due to the effects of the actions of the Mayor and the organization has attempted. The circuit 10, of Miranda, Santa Rita and Cabimas should be hotly contested, because UNT is strong in Santa Rita and it joined in Cabimas can reverse the incidence of votes of Miranda, I think the PSUV can lose depending on the circuit the quality of the Member who proposed UNT. Circuit 11, Simón Bolívar, Lagunillas, Valmore Rodriguez and Baralt, then by the nature and impact of Lagunillas votes - more than 41000 - must win UNT although the PSUV should get more votes and Valmore Baralt Rodríguez. Circuit 12, Catatumbo, Colon, Francisco Javier Pulgar and Sucre, the PSUV must triumph in Columbus, Francisco Javier Pulgar and Catatumbo with what would the deputy.
As we see the sum would give 5 for UNT and partners, while the PSUV would get seven (7). Constituencies would be defined by list and it is hoped that the Indian MP gets the PSUV. That would mean that the best the PSUV would get eight (8) Members and UNT circuits could win lists. Again it all depends on the quality of candidates and their political agenda. However, it is proposed a scenario analysis interesting, we'll see
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
27/01/2010.
Daylight Simulater Alarm Clock Canada
ZULIA February 4 and its historical roots
THE FEBRUARY 4 AND ITS HISTORICAL ROOTS
18 years ago, everyone in our country are wondering what happened. The country had gone from being a model of democracy in Latin America has to be shaken by two significant events: a popular revolt in 1989 and a coup. In the logic of Venezuelans permeated by the status quo and hegemonic power relations, these two events were a historical anomaly. However, there was more appreciation wrong than that.
The accumulation of deep contradictions stemming from the logic of the capitalist system and the political forms that had acquired explosion. You can not lose sight that the model of representative democracy introduced in 1958 was based on two essential conditions: 1) insisting on consensus and 2) avoid conflict. This obsession with stability resulted in the minimization of the huge contrasts from the standpoint of existing social and economic development in Venezuela. That was possible, given the financier of the Venezuelan economy. Do not forget that the productive nature of the oil business in our country is deeply worthwhile: to this day the difference between the cost of producing a barrel of oil sales and the cost is extremely favorable. Yeah well, between 1958-1973 the average barrel of oil was relatively small - ranging between 2.30 and U.S. $ 5 - after the Yom Kippur War, the price of a barrel of oil rose thus generating the state Venezuela will have significant resources to finance public expenditure. This provision allowed for a long time maintain the climate of stability - apparently they crave some Venezuelans. However, the weather was artificial. The contradictions and contrasts remained untouched, the limitations of the status quo unmediated forms of participation by the historical parties (AD, COPEI and URD) were many. The oil income was not actually distributed and the national and transnational capital benefited from it. She had not treated the issue of poverty and crisis in 1983 when he rentier model, contradictions surfaced more quickly. In response, political parties insisted on maintaining a climate of consensus despite impossible - from the standpoint of institutional and economic-to, but his insistence on staying as if nothing had happened after Caracazo - February 1989 - facilitated manifestation of a group of soldiers, far away from the classic militarism which had affected Latin America.
The rest is well known. Chávez, Arias, Ortiz Contreras and company did a coup that failed, but I do not want to focus my reflection on an otherwise trite subject. I want readers of this column understand - as well as some militants of the PSUV-military section of his actions is deeply rooted in the Venezuelan political thought. And not just point out the simplicity of Chávez's links to the ideals of the guerrillas of 60. It's about understanding that has to do with a political break that pattern in the early twentieth century. In the middle period gomecista, long before the events of February 1928, was growing a maturation process and socio-political change. In that change names like José Pío Tamayo, Salvador de la Plaza, Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, Miguel Otero Silva, begin to reflect on the impact of imperialism in the Caribbean. The fact that they gave this reflection on our country is not fortuitous: the whole area had an anti-imperialist climate that ended in the formation of the Anti-Imperialist League of the Caribbean, where we find names like Cesar Sandino, Farabundo Marti, Victor Raul Haya de La Torre, Juan Bosch, among others. It was they, who will introduce the discussion on the possibility of building socialism in these parts. And Jose Carlos Mariategui had thought his philosophical theses about Latin American reality and it would add further reflections on the road from Lenin suggesting - and triumphed in Russia, and Latin American reality itself.
The roots of this way to build raised a dilemma: 1) walk the path of reform without changing the social and economic exploitation or 2) further the changes and build another model of democracy. That dilemma is what led to Romulo Betancourt to distance themselves from Salvador de la Plaza, Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, moving to head the Rómulo Betancourt own commitment to building a model closer to social democracy, of whose dangers and Rosa Luxemburg warned in 1912. This is important to remember, as the gnawed Betancourt with the "cops" - communists would extend to his 2nd term in office (1959-1963) and mark the political process until the arrival of Chavez. It is understood that Chavez is the product of a historic rematch of the left on social democracy, while understanding that it is a phenomenon of enormous historical roots.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
02/02/2010
THE FEBRUARY 4 AND ITS HISTORICAL ROOTS
18 years ago, everyone in our country are wondering what happened. The country had gone from being a model of democracy in Latin America has to be shaken by two significant events: a popular revolt in 1989 and a coup. In the logic of Venezuelans permeated by the status quo and hegemonic power relations, these two events were a historical anomaly. However, there was more appreciation wrong than that.
The accumulation of deep contradictions stemming from the logic of the capitalist system and the political forms that had acquired explosion. You can not lose sight that the model of representative democracy introduced in 1958 was based on two essential conditions: 1) insisting on consensus and 2) avoid conflict. This obsession with stability resulted in the minimization of the huge contrasts from the standpoint of existing social and economic development in Venezuela. That was possible, given the financier of the Venezuelan economy. Do not forget that the productive nature of the oil business in our country is deeply worthwhile: to this day the difference between the cost of producing a barrel of oil sales and the cost is extremely favorable. Yeah well, between 1958-1973 the average barrel of oil was relatively small - ranging between 2.30 and U.S. $ 5 - after the Yom Kippur War, the price of a barrel of oil rose thus generating the state Venezuela will have significant resources to finance public expenditure. This provision allowed for a long time maintain the climate of stability - apparently they crave some Venezuelans. However, the weather was artificial. The contradictions and contrasts remained untouched, the limitations of the status quo unmediated forms of participation by the historical parties (AD, COPEI and URD) were many. The oil income was not actually distributed and the national and transnational capital benefited from it. She had not treated the issue of poverty and crisis in 1983 when he rentier model, contradictions surfaced more quickly. In response, political parties insisted on maintaining a climate of consensus despite impossible - from the standpoint of institutional and economic-to, but his insistence on staying as if nothing had happened after Caracazo - February 1989 - facilitated manifestation of a group of soldiers, far away from the classic militarism which had affected Latin America.
The rest is well known. Chávez, Arias, Ortiz Contreras and company did a coup that failed, but I do not want to focus my reflection on an otherwise trite subject. I want readers of this column understand - as well as some militants of the PSUV-military section of his actions is deeply rooted in the Venezuelan political thought. And not just point out the simplicity of Chávez's links to the ideals of the guerrillas of 60. It's about understanding that has to do with a political break that pattern in the early twentieth century. In the middle period gomecista, long before the events of February 1928, was growing a maturation process and socio-political change. In that change names like José Pío Tamayo, Salvador de la Plaza, Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, Miguel Otero Silva, begin to reflect on the impact of imperialism in the Caribbean. The fact that they gave this reflection on our country is not fortuitous: the whole area had an anti-imperialist climate that ended in the formation of the Anti-Imperialist League of the Caribbean, where we find names like Cesar Sandino, Farabundo Marti, Victor Raul Haya de La Torre, Juan Bosch, among others. It was they, who will introduce the discussion on the possibility of building socialism in these parts. And Jose Carlos Mariategui had thought his philosophical theses about Latin American reality and it would add further reflections on the road from Lenin suggesting - and triumphed in Russia, and Latin American reality itself.
The roots of this way to build raised a dilemma: 1) walk the path of reform without changing the social and economic exploitation or 2) further the changes and build another model of democracy. That dilemma is what led to Romulo Betancourt to distance themselves from Salvador de la Plaza, Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, moving to head the Rómulo Betancourt own commitment to building a model closer to social democracy, of whose dangers and Rosa Luxemburg warned in 1912. This is important to remember, as the gnawed Betancourt with the "cops" - communists would extend to his 2nd term in office (1959-1963) and mark the political process until the arrival of Chavez. It is understood that Chavez is the product of a historic rematch of the left on social democracy, while understanding that it is a phenomenon of enormous historical roots.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
02/02/2010
Is Camera Flash Harmful Or Not
ALVAREZ IF PEACE: FREEDOM O Debauchery? PSUV
ALVAREZ IF PEACE: FREEDOM O Debauchery?
The case around the statements Oswaldo Alvarez Peace is suitable to rescue an important theoretical debate in the field of view. We begin by noting that the idea of \u200b\u200bopinion is initially associated with the Latin expression opinio, which refers more to an idea into action. In this sense, the sense of opinion is closer a form of perception of reality. There is a 2nd way to understand it, that is associated with a moral or custom, in this circumstance the opinion is a form of social pressure. The liberal thinker John Locke, was the one who pointed out that the opinion rather than a form of knowledge is a mechanism of social approval or censure.
On the other hand, we find the idea of \u200b\u200bthe public, which as is well known is also the product of the liberal revolution. Before the bourgeois revolutions, given from the British Liberal Revolution of Cromwell in the seventeenth century, the only truly public was the sovereign, the King. Other subjects of society under the old regime were not public, hence the category of subjects. Will the liberal revolution of thought that enter and merge the idea of \u200b\u200bpublicus, which is a Latin derivation of populus, meaning "the people." Public opinion was associated with the idea of \u200b\u200bdisseminating ideas, thus building a representation where the discussion of ideas must escape from state control, and thus is socially acceptable to talk to the defense of freedom of expression is ensured by the limited control that they have state structures on the instruments - newspapers, magazines and other information- . This will confuse the one hand freedom of expression and freedom of information. Freedom of expression is a philosophical principle of freedom from the point of view of the human condition, but the liberal doctrine itself began to discuss the need to establish accountability to the expression of thought. It was not possible to accept, given the interests of companies acquired the press, especially in the late nineteenth century and throughout the course of the twentieth century, freedom of expression without any responsibility on other essential aspects such as ethics and morals.
Around the freedom of information, is associated increasingly with the expansion of the public sphere and increasing citizen participation, but this tip to confuse one another. Freedom of expression and freedom of information has limitations that derive from ethical considerations. They can express opinions lightly, particularly around the discussion of the political agenda without a decisive test of the claims made. This aspect is essential in the debate on the public agenda and political agenda that happens in our country. It is common to observe how the media - print, audiovisual, and journalists or opinion makers, issue statements full of irresponsible and do it shielded in freedom of thought, which was - and is-a substantial principle of democracy. But it should be pointed out that freedom of thought must be held on liability in the nature of the statement "We can not simply support the issue of a set of concepts and categories without any validity or sound theoretical or practical. In the case of Alvarez Paz, has the right to express an way to see the reality of the country, but when it happens to make allegations that have legal implications must be accompanied by evidence. I can not, lightly, use this space to charge someone unless it is able to prove what I said. To do otherwise is a great responsibility. What happened is another occasion to generate a debate on freedom of expression and information in our country. And I say it once more, as what happened with the termination of the concession to RCTV was another time. The debate, as now, focused on that medium is the representation of freedom of expression and information, when both are characteristic of the condition human. Can not confusing
followed an argument that arose from the eighteenth century as a defense against the enormous power of the state before the public. It is at that moment, where is the idea that print media - newspapers, are the epicenter of the right to information, but at the time when there were still huge obstacles to the consolidation of political rights was understandable that argument, but today three ( 3) centuries later, where dynamics are so many different channels of participation so varied, can not continue arguing about trivia. As is well known, Article 57 and 58 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic, set the right to express their ideas with the responsibilities required, and it is precisely this limitation that is being discussed with the Álvarez Paz.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
24/03/2010
ALVAREZ IF PEACE: FREEDOM O Debauchery?
The case around the statements Oswaldo Alvarez Peace is suitable to rescue an important theoretical debate in the field of view. We begin by noting that the idea of \u200b\u200bopinion is initially associated with the Latin expression opinio, which refers more to an idea into action. In this sense, the sense of opinion is closer a form of perception of reality. There is a 2nd way to understand it, that is associated with a moral or custom, in this circumstance the opinion is a form of social pressure. The liberal thinker John Locke, was the one who pointed out that the opinion rather than a form of knowledge is a mechanism of social approval or censure.
On the other hand, we find the idea of \u200b\u200bthe public, which as is well known is also the product of the liberal revolution. Before the bourgeois revolutions, given from the British Liberal Revolution of Cromwell in the seventeenth century, the only truly public was the sovereign, the King. Other subjects of society under the old regime were not public, hence the category of subjects. Will the liberal revolution of thought that enter and merge the idea of \u200b\u200bpublicus, which is a Latin derivation of populus, meaning "the people." Public opinion was associated with the idea of \u200b\u200bdisseminating ideas, thus building a representation where the discussion of ideas must escape from state control, and thus is socially acceptable to talk to the defense of freedom of expression is ensured by the limited control that they have state structures on the instruments - newspapers, magazines and other information- . This will confuse the one hand freedom of expression and freedom of information. Freedom of expression is a philosophical principle of freedom from the point of view of the human condition, but the liberal doctrine itself began to discuss the need to establish accountability to the expression of thought. It was not possible to accept, given the interests of companies acquired the press, especially in the late nineteenth century and throughout the course of the twentieth century, freedom of expression without any responsibility on other essential aspects such as ethics and morals.
Around the freedom of information, is associated increasingly with the expansion of the public sphere and increasing citizen participation, but this tip to confuse one another. Freedom of expression and freedom of information has limitations that derive from ethical considerations. They can express opinions lightly, particularly around the discussion of the political agenda without a decisive test of the claims made. This aspect is essential in the debate on the public agenda and political agenda that happens in our country. It is common to observe how the media - print, audiovisual, and journalists or opinion makers, issue statements full of irresponsible and do it shielded in freedom of thought, which was - and is-a substantial principle of democracy. But it should be pointed out that freedom of thought must be held on liability in the nature of the statement "We can not simply support the issue of a set of concepts and categories without any validity or sound theoretical or practical. In the case of Alvarez Paz, has the right to express an way to see the reality of the country, but when it happens to make allegations that have legal implications must be accompanied by evidence. I can not, lightly, use this space to charge someone unless it is able to prove what I said. To do otherwise is a great responsibility. What happened is another occasion to generate a debate on freedom of expression and information in our country. And I say it once more, as what happened with the termination of the concession to RCTV was another time. The debate, as now, focused on that medium is the representation of freedom of expression and information, when both are characteristic of the condition human. Can not confusing
followed an argument that arose from the eighteenth century as a defense against the enormous power of the state before the public. It is at that moment, where is the idea that print media - newspapers, are the epicenter of the right to information, but at the time when there were still huge obstacles to the consolidation of political rights was understandable that argument, but today three ( 3) centuries later, where dynamics are so many different channels of participation so varied, can not continue arguing about trivia. As is well known, Article 57 and 58 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic, set the right to express their ideas with the responsibilities required, and it is precisely this limitation that is being discussed with the Álvarez Paz.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
24/03/2010
Bible Verse For Housewarming
ANATOMY OF THE ZULIA
IN THE ANATOMY OF PSUV Zulia
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero / Historian
El Zulia is the primary federal entity of Venezuela, not only by the oil issue, including its political aggregate. A geographical area that shares a slice of the more than 2,200-mile border with Colombia and also brings together a significant voting population - about 2,082,916 registered voters, who represent nearly 15% of the country's electoral universe. Historically, the Zulia state has had an uneven performance in relation to the national country, the explanation of this fact must be viewed in a broader context of building a historical identity associated with the port city's past and assuming a differential anthropology. That mixed with pride differentiality identity has been a political weapon used by the opposition to Chavez in the region.
Chavismo has been a political force characterized by its dispersion in the state. Since its inception in 1997, formed a box of some personal leadership so still survive: the likes of Professor Mary Queipo an important activity at the University of Zulia, Silvestre Villalobos, Jorge Duran Centeno (current ambassador to Panama), are just some characterizations of the political personality. In general, even before the organization of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) could not speak of a well structured organization in Zulia. Precisely this gap is what explains the low probability that had the late Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) to take political power.
The internal conflict reflect a weakness in the regional leadership of the forces of Chavez and foreshadow the problems that Marxist theorists spoke referring to the need for a well-structured game. Following Antonio Gramsci, Chavez has not been able to become a hegemonic power bloc internal scattering. However, it should be pointed out that since 2006 the victory of Chavez in presidential elections has been observed an organizational effort that resulted in the formation of a proposal that tends to bring together the various political processes that develop in the region . The formation of the PSUV has matched the various trends that survive the initial Chavez: the military, which is represented in the figure Durán Centeno and military groups who participated in the 1992 coup attempt, the left represented by historical figures such as José Huerta, Emilio Chirico, Arnoldo Olivares and others who come from a militant and active participation in organizations that were opposed to the AD and COPEI forces in the region ; the university embodied by figures like Maria Queipo, Mario Isea, Rodrigo Cabezas and others that are so important to the university movement in the late 80's and 90 of the last century, and finally those sectors that were adding their from efforts to link Chavez to Arias Cárdenas, including himself should be noted Gian Carlo Di Martino. These forces coexist
with differences and dissimilar perspectives on the dynamics of building the party and how to articulate the people's power, but they agreed on the need to organize around the PSUV seeking thereby to build a historic bloc in the Gramscian sense of the term, allowing them to be able to specify an option of the Bolivarian project progress in Zulia.
Chavismo has progressed - with ups and downs in regional electoral strength. In 2006, obtained a total of 724,254 votes, beating the candidate Manuel Rosales in his own field. That figure is significant the impact of personal leadership and charismatic Hugo Chávez, especially when compared with votes por el chavismo en el año 2005 en las elecciones al parlamento nacional cuando a través de la UVE y el MVR obtuvieron algo más de 350.000. Sin embargo, el año 2007 reflejo la debilidad estructural y organizativa del recién creado PSUV pues en la consulta del referendo por la Reforma Constitucional del 2 de diciembre obtuvo 472.462 votos en la opción del Bloque A y 467.958 en la del Bloque B, reduciéndose su caudal electoral. Los efectos del referendo del 2-D se sintieron en la conformación de los liderazgos internos del partido. Figuras como Rodrigo Cabezas – Ministro de Finanzas en su momento-, Gian Carlo Di Martino (Alcalde de Maracaibo), Gral. Carlos Martínez Mendoza (Presidente CORPOZULIA) comenzaron a disputarse un espacio power internally.
The outcome of this dispute was the triumph of Di Martino's candidacy for governor and displaced internally Rodrigo Cabezas, leading to his replacement as Vice-President of the PSUV in the Zulia-Falcon region. The results of the gubernatorial election in November 2008 and the subsequent defeat of the option Di Martino, reopened to the ideological divide within the party. Electorally, the Vice-President of the PSUV, Jackie Farias, has had to endure the presence of former mayor and discontent generated toward certain sectors, but at the same time you can not deny that succeeded in raising the party's vote to 658,724 votes. This electoral base, that fails to ratify an internal leadership, explains the dilemma that the PSUV is now: 1) restructuring its power base through new primary election or 2) is organized around the leadership of Farias-Di Martino. Both options have risks: the 1st, can lead to internal schism, given the survival of individual differences in the game, however you can create the basis for a re-legitimization of popular organization, the 2nd option may end up increasing fragmentation existing and some disorganization. Process
After November, the trend is favored Rodrigo Cabezas. The proximity to the mayors of Mara, Páez, Padilla, Cabimas, Columbus, San Francisco and other winners of the regional elections, keeps alive the figure of former Prime Minister and placed in a difficult internal situation the followers of Di Martino. There is no direct confrontation, but certainly in the internal forces are mobilized to resolve its political leadership in the party.
All that scenario, should be structured on the urgent need for the PSUV to build an information matrix as to minimize the media campaign built by Manuel Rosales and his advisers, where they have to embody the meaning and significance of Zulia. If the PSUV is not able to develop a discourse that identifies with the political possibilities regional image are minimized and thus, the internal differences are not corrected. The recent dispute over port and airport of Maracaibo is a political opportunity to set the course for the future of the PSUV, if the party manages to survive and weakening regional sentiments Rosales in his leadership, we will see the emergence of a new political leadership strategy would allow Chavez and his forces take the city of Zulia, but everything is subject to the actions of the PSUV and their ability to articulate coherently.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero historian, political analyst
Juane1208@gmail.com
20/03/2009
IN THE ANATOMY OF PSUV Zulia
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero / Historian
El Zulia is the primary federal entity of Venezuela, not only by the oil issue, including its political aggregate. A geographical area that shares a slice of the more than 2,200-mile border with Colombia and also brings together a significant voting population - about 2,082,916 registered voters, who represent nearly 15% of the country's electoral universe. Historically, the Zulia state has had an uneven performance in relation to the national country, the explanation of this fact must be viewed in a broader context of building a historical identity associated with the port city's past and assuming a differential anthropology. That mixed with pride differentiality identity has been a political weapon used by the opposition to Chavez in the region.
Chavismo has been a political force characterized by its dispersion in the state. Since its inception in 1997, formed a box of some personal leadership so still survive: the likes of Professor Mary Queipo an important activity at the University of Zulia, Silvestre Villalobos, Jorge Duran Centeno (current ambassador to Panama), are just some characterizations of the political personality. In general, even before the organization of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) could not speak of a well structured organization in Zulia. Precisely this gap is what explains the low probability that had the late Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) to take political power.
The internal conflict reflect a weakness in the regional leadership of the forces of Chavez and foreshadow the problems that Marxist theorists spoke referring to the need for a well-structured game. Following Antonio Gramsci, Chavez has not been able to become a hegemonic power bloc internal scattering. However, it should be pointed out that since 2006 the victory of Chavez in presidential elections has been observed an organizational effort that resulted in the formation of a proposal that tends to bring together the various political processes that develop in the region . The formation of the PSUV has matched the various trends that survive the initial Chavez: the military, which is represented in the figure Durán Centeno and military groups who participated in the 1992 coup attempt, the left represented by historical figures such as José Huerta, Emilio Chirico, Arnoldo Olivares and others who come from a militant and active participation in organizations that were opposed to the AD and COPEI forces in the region ; the university embodied by figures like Maria Queipo, Mario Isea, Rodrigo Cabezas and others that are so important to the university movement in the late 80's and 90 of the last century, and finally those sectors that were adding their from efforts to link Chavez to Arias Cárdenas, including himself should be noted Gian Carlo Di Martino. These forces coexist
with differences and dissimilar perspectives on the dynamics of building the party and how to articulate the people's power, but they agreed on the need to organize around the PSUV seeking thereby to build a historic bloc in the Gramscian sense of the term, allowing them to be able to specify an option of the Bolivarian project progress in Zulia.
Chavismo has progressed - with ups and downs in regional electoral strength. In 2006, obtained a total of 724,254 votes, beating the candidate Manuel Rosales in his own field. That figure is significant the impact of personal leadership and charismatic Hugo Chávez, especially when compared with votes por el chavismo en el año 2005 en las elecciones al parlamento nacional cuando a través de la UVE y el MVR obtuvieron algo más de 350.000. Sin embargo, el año 2007 reflejo la debilidad estructural y organizativa del recién creado PSUV pues en la consulta del referendo por la Reforma Constitucional del 2 de diciembre obtuvo 472.462 votos en la opción del Bloque A y 467.958 en la del Bloque B, reduciéndose su caudal electoral. Los efectos del referendo del 2-D se sintieron en la conformación de los liderazgos internos del partido. Figuras como Rodrigo Cabezas – Ministro de Finanzas en su momento-, Gian Carlo Di Martino (Alcalde de Maracaibo), Gral. Carlos Martínez Mendoza (Presidente CORPOZULIA) comenzaron a disputarse un espacio power internally.
The outcome of this dispute was the triumph of Di Martino's candidacy for governor and displaced internally Rodrigo Cabezas, leading to his replacement as Vice-President of the PSUV in the Zulia-Falcon region. The results of the gubernatorial election in November 2008 and the subsequent defeat of the option Di Martino, reopened to the ideological divide within the party. Electorally, the Vice-President of the PSUV, Jackie Farias, has had to endure the presence of former mayor and discontent generated toward certain sectors, but at the same time you can not deny that succeeded in raising the party's vote to 658,724 votes. This electoral base, that fails to ratify an internal leadership, explains the dilemma that the PSUV is now: 1) restructuring its power base through new primary election or 2) is organized around the leadership of Farias-Di Martino. Both options have risks: the 1st, can lead to internal schism, given the survival of individual differences in the game, however you can create the basis for a re-legitimization of popular organization, the 2nd option may end up increasing fragmentation existing and some disorganization. Process
After November, the trend is favored Rodrigo Cabezas. The proximity to the mayors of Mara, Páez, Padilla, Cabimas, Columbus, San Francisco and other winners of the regional elections, keeps alive the figure of former Prime Minister and placed in a difficult internal situation the followers of Di Martino. There is no direct confrontation, but certainly in the internal forces are mobilized to resolve its political leadership in the party.
All that scenario, should be structured on the urgent need for the PSUV to build an information matrix as to minimize the media campaign built by Manuel Rosales and his advisers, where they have to embody the meaning and significance of Zulia. If the PSUV is not able to develop a discourse that identifies with the political possibilities regional image are minimized and thus, the internal differences are not corrected. The recent dispute over port and airport of Maracaibo is a political opportunity to set the course for the future of the PSUV, if the party manages to survive and weakening regional sentiments Rosales in his leadership, we will see the emergence of a new political leadership strategy would allow Chavez and his forces take the city of Zulia, but everything is subject to the actions of the PSUV and their ability to articulate coherently.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero historian, political analyst
Juane1208@gmail.com
20/03/2009
5 Weeks Pregnant But Very Dry Mucus
SOCIALISM IN VENEZUELA: MOST OF THE PSUV
The debate over the construction of socialism in Venezuela has gone through two actors really significant. One of them, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) emerged in the early 70's of last century, the product of a division of the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). The other, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), emerged from a strategy of unity of forces posed by President Hugo Chavez immediately after his victory in December 2006.
There is, in our humble opinion as a scholar of the history of ideas in Venezuela, a common trunk between the two projects: the denial of Soviet dogmatism or called real socialism. Both the MAS and the PSUV, became manifest in the mouth of some of its main representatives (Teodoro Petkoff, Hugo Chavez) very strong criticism to the deviation of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), which led to the decision-making over limiting the debate and discussion, ending in the construction of a very rigid society, denying the revolutionary character of socialism proposed by Marx, in Capital and in other jobs.
The way they denied a difference between the two movements. While the MAS, initially defined as a socialist party affiliation Marxist-Leninist, gradually gave way way to discussion on socialist construction to move by a reformist then ended and pragmatic structure is outdated today. The position exemplified by the attitude of former leaders of MAS, as Julio Montoya or my good friend William Barnett, who today are the social side - represented by A New Time, reflects an old argument that was raised internally MAS about the impossibility of building a socialist alternative to the hegemonic project of AD and COPEI in the 70's and 80's, and therefore concluded that it was imperative to be subsumed under these political movements to be an option for power.
PSUV For his part, also is in the dilemma of reform or revolution. And that situation should lead to a historical review ending and preventing MAS. On the one hand, certain elements of the structure of the PSUV are more dedicated to enjoy privileged conditions that result from the exercise hegemony - in the Gramscian sense, the power to build socialism. These sectors within the structure of the PSUV are deeply bureaucratic and fossilized as a threat to their privileged social organizational processes that occur under the figures of communities mobilized through water tables, power, community councils and others. In view of these reformers, lack of revolutionary commitment and ethics, it is essential to the enjoyment of power and use it for their own benefit.
there - and thank goodness this is the case, another section in the PSUV, structured in the ideological sense of the revolution, led by President Hugo Chavez and some other players who pose serious discussion about the construction of socialism. Priority for them is the process of building a cadre party, trained and experienced in the revolutionary ethic which spoke Che and Marx himself, while insisting on the organization and political education of citizens as a condition the exercise of participation. Leave holding the necessary review and changes in the relationships that make the actions of capital and labor. It is the path supported by Marx in the Grundrisse (the full title is Grundrisse der Kritik Oekonomie or Lines of Political Fundamental Critique of Political Economy, released in 1939 in Moscow) where he talks about the road to "socialist project" as a way leading to the dissolution of the conditions of exploitation and alienation of capitalism.
Marx's approach, which somehow is recovered by the truly revolutionary aspect of the PSUV led by Chavez, speaking of the need for a "development "Universal versus individual development" unidimensional "of capitalism, which are based on relations of alienation that allow the exploitation of man by man. It is, and in some ways this vision is embodied in the Plan Simón Bolívar (2007-2013) to build socius (friends, partners). This process involves a multiple action: first, the revolution of the productive and on the other, the revolution of consciousness, about the social formation. It is this point, the mark of division between revolutionaries and reformists within the PSUV. The reformers are reluctant to change the objective conditions of the capitalist exploitation, as this would mean the end of its enrichment facilities at the same time, resist the process of training that would make them "visible" to the rest of the militants really committed. Therefore, those who are active in the socialist construction next advocate training, discussion and construction of objective conditions of dissolution of the alienating nature of capitalism. We believe that the PSUV should carefully review the historical experience of MAS, to not end up like their predecessors. History teaches life.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com 05/05/2009
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