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Socialism in Venezuela on the elections in the PSUV

PSUV ON ELECTIONS

The process organized by the political leadership of the PSUV is an important lesson for democracy. First, a call is pending since 2006 when President Chavez himself spoke of the need to generate coherent ideological supporters of his government, thus ensuring progress in the consolidation of the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci call the hegemonic bloc.
Secondly, this process opens up the space on the directionality of the principal socio-political party today. This is not just thinking what is the way to go, also includes the way it is perceived that way and that must mean a great discussion with the bases. Resolve the contradiction between the bases and the party bureaucracy is vital, not only for the future of the PSUV also for the progress of the Bolivarian project itself.
The dilemma of what to do is one of the main topics of discussion of the revolutionary parties. That choice try to be answered by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in the preludes of the Russian Revolution and now aims to be answered by those serving in the PSUV. But as we point to two major thinkers of socialism to validate the process of democracy that must end in a large socio-political discussion, we note what we call dangers of this new consummate choice.
Leon Trotsky, said in the Revolution Betrayed (1936) that the mixture of the party structure with the state bureaucracy had killed the ability to critique and advance the revolutionary party. What Tronski concerned with this? He was referring to the gradual elimination of social leaders emerged next to the dynamism of the political transition from Czarist Russia to revolutionary Russia. In this passage is given a set of actions arising from the popular enthusiasm organization achieved by the proposed radical change in the October Revolution, but this was slowly numbed by the excessive zeal and control the party bureaucracy, which was stripped of his animosity revolutionary militants to replace obedience and self-interest of a new elite: the official bureaucracy. This risk is present in the results on Sunday. I disagree with the fact that, councilors, mayors, members of the state apparatus also move to control the party apparatus. This removes a space that can be occupied by those actors who are responsible for organizing social responses from their actions in the Land Committees, Water, Community Councils, tables energy techniques, members of the missions, to a set of actors who have gained prominence and now threatened by some of these "officials" are engaged only there to look after their own share of power. We must be fair to say that not all of these officials fall within this parameter, but many of them.
This danger, not only had been warned by Troskie. Gramsci himself had also said in his philosophical and political writings in the Journal of the Carceli (1929-1933) when he warned that the Italian Communist Party had become a party of officials and was no longer a revolutionary workers party.
The fact that the Congress ideology present this set of officials, causes you to lose the revolutionary impulse. This is so for one simple reason: the bureaucrat does not think the reality, only acts as a cog in the machinery of state, filling out paperwork, meeting procedures. Until that happens, the social revolutionary and committed actor has to interact with actual problems, to organize and deal at the same time. The logic of action of the actor involved is substantially less complicated than the official fossil. Troskie knew that, Gramsci and Rosa Luxemburg, to name just three (3) notorious Marxist thinkers. Even Iztvan Meszaros, who has just won the Freedom Award warns him by pointing to threats of this type of behavior in construction of socialism. Sunday
experience, indicates that those who have been elected to Congress will provide the foundation ideological future of the party and the revolution, must consider these dangers and threats that ended the twentieth century socialism and can be an ultimatum to XXI century socialism. Some time ago someone told me that the XXI century socialism did not exist, that is true. Nor was there liberalism and capitalism before Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke will think, so the commitment from all militant revolutionary is to think that reality, but seeing it from the experience of what happened - and their mistakes, in the twentieth century. We will wait to see if this conference ideological is able to visualize this problem. I have hope so.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
18/11/2009

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Socialism in Venezuela

SOCIALISM IN VENEZUELA: THE HIGHER THE
PSUV
The debate over the construction of socialism in Venezuela has gone through two actors really significant. One of them, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) emerged in the early 70's of last century, the product of a division of the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). The other, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), emerged from a strategy of unity of forces posed by President Hugo Chavez immediately after his victory December 2006.
There is, in our humble opinion as a scholar of the history of ideas in Venezuela, a common trunk between the two projects: the denial of Soviet dogmatism or the so-called real socialism. Both the MAS and the PSUV, became manifest in the mouth of some of its main representatives (Teodoro Petkoff, Hugo Chavez) very strong criticism to the deviation of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), which led to the decision-making over limiting the debate and discussion, ending in the construction of a very rigid society, denying the revolutionary character of socialism proposed by Marx, in Capital and in other jobs.
The way they denied a difference between the two movements. While the MAS, initially defined as a socialist party Marxist-Leninist party affiliation, was gradually giving way to discussion on socialist construction to move by a reformist then ended and pragmatic structure is outdated today. The position exemplified by the attitude of former leaders of MAS, as Julio Montoya or my good friend William Barnett, who today are the social side - represented by A New Time, reflects an old argument that was raised internally MAS about the impossibility of building a socialist alternative to the hegemonic project AD and COPEI in the 70's and 80's, and therefore concluded that it was imperative to be subsumed under these political movements to be an option for power.
PSUV For his part, is also the dilemma of reform or revolution. And that situation should lead to a historical review ending and preventing MAS. On the one hand, certain elements of the structure of the PSUV are more dedicated to enjoy privileged conditions that result from the exercise hegemony - in the Gramscian sense, the power to build socialism. These sectors within the structure of the PSUV are deeply bureaucratic and fossilized as a threat to their privileges social organizational processes that occur under the figures of communities mobilized through water tables, power, community councils and others. In view of these reformers, lacking commitment and revolutionary ethics, it is essential to the enjoyment of power and use it for its own benefit.
there - and thank goodness this is the case, another section in the PSUV, structured in the ideological sense of the revolution, led by President Hugo Chavez and some other players who pose serious discussion about the construction of socialism. Priority for them is the process of building a cadre party, trained and hardened revolutionary ethic in which Che spoke Marx himself, while insisting on the organization and political education of citizens, as a condition of exercise participation. Leave holding the necessary review and changes in the relationships that make the actions of capital and labor. It is the path supported by Marx in the Grundrisse (the full title is Grundrisse der Kritik Oekonomie or Lines of Political Fundamental Critique of Political Economy, released in 1939 in Moscow) where he talks about the road to "socialist project" as a way leading to the dissolution of the conditions of exploitation and alienation of capitalism.
Marx's approach, which somehow is recovered by the truly revolutionary aspect of the PSUV led by Chavez, speaks of the need for a "universal development" of individuals in contrast to development "unidimensional" of capitalism, which relations are based alienation that allow the exploitation of man by man. It is, and in some ways this vision is embodied in the Plan Simón Bolívar (2007-2013) to build socius (friends, partners). This process involves a multiple action: first, the revolution of the productive and on the other, the revolution of consciousness on socialist education. It is this point, the mark of division between revolutionaries and reformists within the PSUV. The reformers are reluctant to change the objective conditions of capitalist exploitation, as this would mean the end of its enrichment facilities at the same time, resist the formation process that would make them "visible" to the rest of the militants really committed. Therefore, those who are active in the socialist construction next advocate training, discussion and construction of objective conditions of dissolution of the alienating nature of capitalism. We believe that the PSUV should carefully review the historical experience MAS, not to end as did their predecessors. History teaches life.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
05/05/2009
Juane1208@gmail.com

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PSUV: CRISIS IN THE ZULIA

PSUV: CRISIS IN THE ZULIA

The operation of the PSUV is highly contradictory, especially as it is geographical space Zulia . Yes it must be recognized the efforts of organization and mobilization advance between 2008 - 2009, we can not criticize the inaction in which it is immersed Chavez's party.
In Zulia, is a situation in another context should be exploited. Manuel Rosales's flight resulting in a solid blow the leadership structure of the opposition in the state. Although we have no doubt that the power structure has not been removed, the fact of the absence of Rosales has unleashed a struggle for control of the device between supporters of Paul Perez and those who crave to reach spaces.
output Rosales, unleashed the demons of personal desires in the PSUV Zulia, the various factions - that still exist within the party-are in the dilemma of coalesced around the leadership of Omar Prieto, Mayor of San Francisco or aligned with Louis Caldera, Mayor Mara. However, you can not help noticing that the PSUV operational disruption is evident in the city of Maracaibo. The structure political party has done nothing to regain electoral areas in the state capital, which is key to the realization of any electoral success. Until that happens, the Mayor - Manager-Daniel Ponn has launched a fierce presence in every parish, bringing forward investment plans, handing out perks and benefits, thereby seeking to become the official candidate of UNT, when convened by the CNE .
The PSUV has not responded to the governance of Ponn and much less to what was done by Paul Perez, who quietly increase political control inherited from Manuel Rosales. However, the development of the PSUV in Zulia, continues as usual: epileptic.
to continue that inaction, under the terrible internal competition, the outcome of any election will be the same: the defeat of Chavez. That is an indication that the ideological work has been - to say the least-poor. On the other hand, it appears that the proposal of the 3 R - revision, rectification and relaunch "has not been understood. Bers to say what we say: let's see if the Municipality of Maracaibo. The difference between Paul Perez and Di Martino was nearly 120,000 votes (333,955 vs. 219,256), with overwhelming defeats in popular parishes where it is assumed that the programs and the national government action act. In these areas, the opposition to Chavez has increased their presence, reducing the advantage that the PSUV had Antonio Borjas Romero and Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, while UNT widens lead in parishes as Chiquinquirá Aranza Christ, Bolivar, Coquivacoa, Cecilio Acosta. These figures speak of inaction in the state capital, a behavior that has no justification to consider that the main opposition leader is fled and the government increased economic activity through PDVSA.
The situation is even more disturbing to look at other municipalities where the PSUV won spaces. Such is the case of Cabimas, where the Mayor's recovery of control exercised by AD-UNT. However, the results of December 2008 when the PSUV candidate won with little advantage can be reversed if not consolidated local presence, yes will lead to the unification of the opposition parties control of the PSUV in Cabimas be lost. This case is an excellent example of the difficulties in consolidating government action in Zulia. Paradoxically analyzed as relying on the financial support of PDVSA, has not been achieved electoral success in the oil broker (Simón Bolívar, Lagunillas). The explanation must be sought in the perfect cultural manipulation that has been building opposition to appropriate identification with the socio-historical values \u200b\u200bin the region. As this happens, el PSUV sigue en luchas intestinas, sin sentido en cada espacio. Bajo ese escenario, rescatar al Zulia del control de la oposición luce, por decir lo menos, imposible. Habrá que ver sí la dirigencia regional tiene la voluntad de aplicar las 3 R, en mí parecer eso no ocurrirá.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historiador
Juane1208@gmail.com
30/09/2009

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Chavez, Vargas Llosa and Intellectuals

CHÁVEZ, VARGAS LLOSA Y LOS INTELECTUALES

La realización del Foro de CEDICE sobre Libertad y Democracia en Caracas, fue propicia para reunir a otro grupo de intelectuales latinoamericanos de izquierda. Se trata sin duda de la demostración que nuestro país es el epicentro de un muy serio debate político about the prospects of political change.
The nature of the meeting provided to delve on the issue of the relationship between political discourse, discourse of power and handling. When it comes to political discourse, we refer to forms of reproduction of political power, domination or abuse of power, understood as the ability to modify the behavior of another. In that sense, the discourse of power is an expression of social relations expressed through various media (visual, written, espot propaganda, etc.) and tends to be manipulated, understood as a communicative and interactional practice through which the handler has control, or intends to do, about other people. The handling, power and abuse involving this. The question would be: what is the relationship between political discourse, discourse of power and handling with the visit of intellectuals to Venezuela? The answer is given by the context and the text for the production of speech acts of the actors involved: President Hugo Chávez, the intellectual Mario Vargas Llosa, Jorge Castañeda, Enrique Klause, Fernando Buen Abad, Luis Brito García and Roberto Hernández Montoya . This is a moment or socio-political situation where a group of actors agree on media coverage - print and audiovisual-through which concepts and categories that emit can achieve the conviction of another.
political discourse as a discourse of power - or counter-is essential to "convince" around a position, political project or perception of reality. The discourse of power is to exercise control over the minds of the recipients of this discourse is key for those actors who have access to the media. It is certainly the case for all the nominees. However, the positions of one and the others vary. While Chavez Montoya Hernández Brito Garcia and defend a model of rupture with the logic of capitalist domination, Vargas Llosa, Klause Castaneda and lean toward liberal late-capitalist model. This means that opposing players try to use their access to the media to convince the general public.
We're talking about a power struggle in its clearest expression. And that struggle was carried out through the media. Chavez, Montoya and Brown used the national system of public, while Vargas Llosa and private media company (Globovisión, El Nacional, El Universal, among others). Such methods, made use of manipulation through the use of short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM). The MCP seeks immediate analysis that allow perception the fact without deep interpretations. The MLP, on the contrary, seeks knowledge, attitudes and ideology. The MCP is a step to consolidate positions that remain in the MLP. To do this, use is made of handling, presenting strategies that include: one, emphasize the own positions, the speaker's moral superiority and their sources, and thus the inferiority of the other. This element is clear in the interview that El Nacional (Sunday 31/05/2009, N-8) Vargas Llosa makes when he says, "is a very prototypical - (Chavez) - Latin American and Third World ... and is a general problem for truly democratic culture to thrive. " That speech, Chavez presented a historic setback in Latin American history and that minimizes its political value.
Two, focus on the new belief that the manipulator - Vargas Llosa, is intended to be accepted. In the case of that interview, it is submitted to Chavez and his model of democracy as a historical accident, as a model of the traditional left which is dangerous to coexistence: "There is a space in which the left and right confused if they are democratic and if they are liberal, so there are ways to fight extreme left represented by Chavez. " Three discredit sources or alternative beliefs, the Peruvian writer did when referring to Chavez and the proposal for debate said: "" He never seriously proposed to have an exchange has never accepted (...) discuss with anyone, has always been a monologue autistic "(BBC World). This was looking less serious not only to the positions of president, also his own political status as an advocate for a model of participatory democracy. Finally, the fourth strategy of manipulation is given by the appeal of ideologies, attitudes and emotions relevant to the recipients of the speech. Vargas Llosa uses a position where he and intellectuals who were accompanying him are the representation of dialogue - which is a value essence of democracy "but the" other "- Chavez and company, are not prone to it:" We are for dialogue, what we stand for is dialogue, rationality, laying down their passion for politics "(BBC World 29 / 05/2009).
The press and broadcast media, close to the opposition to Chavez's visit finally took the group of intellectuals led by Vargas Llosa to raise an array of opinion noted several elements: 1) Chavez is a danger for Latin America, 2) the democratic model proposed by his government is deeply contrary to the values \u200b\u200band cultural elements of Latin, 3) is a theoretical inability to define XXI century socialism. That strategy, we insist, in the MLP seeks to impact the citizens, widening the discursive matrices are woven into the network of media - print and broadcast-aligned with liberal capitalism. It is therefore essential to remove the matrices used to build the manipulation of the media, seeking to justify and legitimize the action itself while it discredits that of "other." Such tampering is firmly allied with the academic, trying to be implicated in the so-called "episodic memory" that is associated with the historical identity. It aims to produce generalizations who do not seek to inquire into the conceptual elements implicit in discursive statements of the opponent, however, the primary objective is the lightness in the treatment of subjects whose ideological content is essential. A clear example is shown by another guest Plinio Mendoza Apuleius, when referring to the XXI Century Socialism establishing an association - inaccurate, between the model proposed by Chávez and the Real Socialism failed, employing the reference of "communism "" Socialism of the XXI century "advocated by the national government is not so, but" what is commonly known as communism, and that's the most unusual thing that you can offer to a country after the failure of this model in the twentieth century "(BBC News 29/05/2009).
This partnership seeks to influence the" episodic memory "- or historical, so that the reader of the statements immediately think of Colombian journalist that the model proposed by the president of Venezuela tends - unstoppable-the failure, as happened with the USSR. The manipulation is based on the use of the beliefs of the recipients to exercise mind control, which seeks to dominate the actions receptor based on those same beliefs manipulated. Therefore, the debate about the role of the media is not a trivial matter, however the real challenge of the Bolivarian process at the present time is to expose this manipulation, the effects on volunteering and participation around the model suggested in the Bolivarian project, can be fatal.
handling In this context, the generation and dissemination of print and broadcast media for political discourse in itself is a reinforcement of their own manipulation. This is why we see headlines like the El Universal (Sunday 31/05/2009) in the column that journalist Roberto Giusti entitled: Why Chavez crumpled to the debate with Mario Vargas Llosa. The overall strategy of manipulation is to present a situation so that this - out of line with reality-match interests and perceptions that are intended to be transmitted to the receivers. It looks raised - as manipulative, given that dominant - or at least those who had hegemonic control in the past to expand their control of power, generating information, education and other social practices that aim to influence the knowledge of receivers about reality, the worst part is that this process is carried out under open practices that are assumed to be fully legitimate under the guise of "freedom of expression." This will transgress social norms of ethics, balance and fairness, creating an illegitimate communication, to favor only one way to represent reality.
No doubt, review the content of the chronicle of Roberto Giusti, we see clearly endorsed the items noted. The journalist, using the principle of freedom - which is a fundamental part of the justification of the capitalist model "says that the cause of the failure to realize the debate among intellectuals was Chávez himself and not the resistance of the intellectuals of the right to discuss with their peers. Giusti states bluntly that "the root cause that led him (Chavez) to respond to a line out the characteristics of the autocrat, used to order and be obeyed, to talk and not listen and sentenced without the right to reply" (El Universal 31/05/2009 1-2). The handling is manifested by a distortion of reality, and it disengages the reality to fit the goal of dominating the perception of the receptors, suggesting that the debate was conducted by the "fear" of Chávez to discuss and hear opposing ideas. They are insisting on ignoring those who did not show Alo Presidente space were the intellectuals headed by Vargas Llosa, and that situation is replaced by the representation of "cowardice and fear" the debate in conditions of freedom.
This completes the transformation of apparent reality. The fantasy that replaces reality, and all with the consent of the audiovisual media and printed perfectly articulated in the course of manipulation.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
01/06/2009

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VENEZUELA: 10 YEARS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING

VENEZUELA: 10 YEARS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING

The obsession dates can not see the process in context. Yeah well, there are ten (10) years after the adoption of the Constitution, can not lose sight of the overall dynamics of socio-political setting. 1st place, all this is framed within a broader process of depletion of the forms of politics that prevailed from the 2nd half of the twentieth century. It is an approach that emphasizes the "virtue" of systems of political representation, through which it takes "necessary" requirement of distance from citizen participation, by restricting only upon election. It is no accident
observe and Latin America as a whole these forms of articulation of democratic life ended in conflict and mobilization of great weight, as happened in Caracas and Buenos Aires in the late 80's, the twentieth century. Political systems based on corporate relationships, where large pressure groups (economic, political, union) established partnerships on which shared the benefits of capitalist rent, could not keep that trust and forced peace and gave to their own conflicts and contradictions they generate.
In 2nd place, you can not lose sight of the fact that changes in the forms of democratic governance resulted in increased demands for direct participation of the groups. We analyze the new meaning is given to political citizenship and the concept of popular sovereignty. Increasingly became more common in the final years of the twentieth century, the demands of increased opportunities for coordination and participation. The resistance factor to this requirement speaks of the emergence of the phenomenon of "anti" as a rejection of forms of representation of the historical parties.
In 3rd place, the disastrous effects of neoliberal economic system settings and architecture of the National Government is another element that explains the historical changes generated. These three (3) briefly mentioned dynamics are significant for understanding the socio-political setting that comes with the Constituent Assembly in Venezuela. On the other hand, we can not fail to note the impact that the constitutional process in Colombia in 1991. It is understood that kicks off what is called the New Latin American constitutionalism, which proposes that constitutions are not perfect bodies and unchanging over time, instead must be adjusted periodically to allow its adaptation to social change processes. In our case, the Constitution sealed a historic lack of rights that had since independence. Processes linked to three unsolved problems, such as access to property, the issue of political participation and real equality in society, are treated in the Constitution of 1999 and have allowed a very significant dynamic in the development of citizenship.
must not fail to note, that this process of socio-political adjustment was possible because the joint a discourse of change, embodied in the figure of Chávez with expectations of improvement of a population whose strata D and E, came to become the key constituency in the Venezuelan political process. The capacity of the Chavez speech, to articulate these demands is what has made possible his stay in power, so look closely at the discontented citizens expressing over such issues as quality of life, the lack of response to their demands The slowness of the state apparatus should be called a warning to those who are aligned on the side of the Bolivarian revolution.
Ten years later, the commitment to the construction and articulation of a society actually modify the conditions of appropriation and exploitation of man by man, remains the driving force behind the reflection, but in the meantime has been articulating a dangerous sector for the continuation of this process: the Bolibourgeoisie. It is the reformer who was dressed in red and takes advantage of his condition, is the official bureaucrat, the deputy who is not accountable to their constituents, so is the danger of more of the same. Ten years later we have to think about what can and what has been, to do so is to assume the title of the statement by Trotsky in his work of 1936: The Revolution Betrayed.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero

Juane1208@gmail.com Historian

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ROSALES: RELIGION, HISTORY AND HANDLING

ROSALES: RELIGION, HISTORY AND HANDLING

Yes we accept that power - following the definition of Max Weber, is the ability to modify the behavior of others by a group of individuals, we must also accept that the exercise While power itself implies notions of violence, may not always be based on market mechanisms to achieve the conviction. In many cases, those in power make use of various cultural constructs, ideological and historical. Is that the case of Manuel Rosales and the current governor of Zulia, Pablo Perez.
Identifying underlying the official propaganda of the Interior, in the sense that the political representatives of the party Un Nuevo Tiempo - Manuel Pablo Pérez Rosales first and currently, are the embodiment of Zulia, is a manifestation of the maxim that we announced at the beginning. All tissue
discourse of official actions, is structured in the distinct cultural insistence of Zulia to the rest of the country. In practice we must recognize that differentiality, no doubt because of the peculiarities of Zulia, though without seeming contradiction, this recognition does not mean we share the representation that seeks to build a sense of alienation towards the Venezuelans themselves. To this end, we have structured a very logical Character manipulation identity of Zulia, fed from historical research and properly supported from the official apparatus of our regional organization, mixing elements of historical, ideological and religious.
Historically, we know that the historical space Maracaibo - as we speak of the historical region that includes the current state of Zulia and the states of Mérida, Táchira and Trujillo, as well as part of Lara and Falcon "had a strength derived from the impact of the port Maracaibo acquired since the beginning of the seventeenth century, as a result of having served out the goods and products coming from the Andes. This trade, combined with the fact that our state takes the form of a horseshoe, by all the surrounding physical - to the west the Sierra de Perija, south-eastern Andean Cordillera and the Lara-Falcon system, affected the isolation of this particular historical space and the limited contact with the rest of the territory of the Captaincy General of Venezuela and the later republic. About this isolation and the strength - insist on it, we developed a multi-elite, their social ties, cultural, political and economic use - and use-that prosperity for their own benefit. The oft-named autonomy and identity of Zulia, was and is an excuse for their own benefit of that elite, who framed regionalism has subjugated, exploited, and enjoyment of wealth without any scruples. We have said that Rosales - just like Jorge Venancio Pulgar-Sutherland and have employed the enormous historical pride of Zulia for their own purposes. Have called on citizens of Zulia to deal with the central power in a "supposed" self-defense and ended up leaving those who promised to defend.
The obvious question is how this phenomenon has been generated?. Both in the nineteenth century and in the final years of the twentieth century and the beginning of this century, has built an interpretative framework, understood as a set of rules, rituals and symbols used to justify the hegemony of the elite multifunctional. The religious cult of the Virgin of Chiquinquirá, the formal structure of the Catholic Church, the cultural industries controlled by that elite, and the ability to handle economic served - and serves, to associate them with the Zulia. It is interesting to see how propaganda and Pablo Pérez Rosales speaks of the government of Zulia and the means employed in the state song to accompany the release of their works. It is known one of those ads, which for much of its length it does is go with the pictures of works, roads and alterations made by the executive with Anthem. We find there a suggested message: those who Zulia govern are the "others" are explicitly presented as perpetrators of "this Zulia. Anyone who claims to draw on those political leaders any criticism, merely attack the Zulia. Thus we see how to construct an identification between the political representative and the identity of Zulia. That strategy is not new, insist on it-it was implemented in the nineteenth century with success, and is again made with the consent and advice of a group of intellectuals and historians - of great respect and esteem for me, as part of Institutional support team Pablo Pérez y Manuel Rosales. The worst of it is that through this partnership, manipulation concealed the interest of promoting deep feelings of the Venezuelan differential across and from there, holding ideas of secession or autonomy for the territorial integrity risky.
is to feel that there is a great "injustice" manifested by the contribution it makes and receives Zulia thereby seeks to mobilize the Zulia "in defense of the same." This defense is framed in political action of the regional government and their political heads, who appear as "real" champions of the identity of Zulia, when in fact they only defend their own economic interests.


Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero 26/05/2009
Juane1208@gmail.com
historian

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SOCIO-POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 2010

SOCIO-POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 2010

Historians are not used to establish situations, but as activists in the immediate history that we are, we make use of prospective studies to raise possible socio-political contexts in 2010. The first is that we must recognize that Chavez's popularity remains, although it has suffered from the effects of the crisis in the electricity sector, as well as cases of corruption. Recent studies of polling (not exactly close to Chavez) indicate that its popularity varies even between 40 and 45% (Datanálisis, IVAD, Consultores 21). That means that from the communication point of view the figure of Chavez remains a reference point and the worst of it (the opposition) is that nobody appears to compete with him.
What this means is that contrary to what some characters start saying the opposition, the chances for them to obtain a majority in the legislative elections of 2010 are not very high. What helps us understand why Chavez, despite being full of a few bad candidates, corruption scandals, excess bureaucracy, will be majority in 2010 is the subject of the public agenda and political agenda. In studies of political communication when talking about public agenda is to explain the importance or relevance to acquire certain themes or topics for hearings or public. This differs from the political agenda, which is one that seeks to establish the response of political actors are the issues arising from ordinary citizens. What we say is that the opposition's political agenda does not match at any time with the public agenda, despite attempts by the media to match and fit so no glue. For example, some figures from the latest survey provided both Datanálisis and Consultores 21 (November 2009). The big issues for citizens - in order of priority- are the main problem is unemployment 24%, improve the economy 18.6%, 18.3% security, housing 5.6%, to improve the health system 5.3%, 4.9% solve social problems, education 4.4%, continue with the ideology 3.9% 3.8% Peace, harmony, end corruption 3.1%, ending the revolution 1.5%, to improve relations with other countries 1.2% , 1.1% live in democracy. As you see, are all issues that call on the world political psychology intrapersonal. While this thought the Venezuelan opposition politicians are bent on the issue of the "dictatorship of Chavez," the follies of Chavez the idea of \u200b\u200b"Cubanize to Venezuela," Chavez, everything revolves around the president. With this, the most important political agenda is not the most important agenda of Venezuelans. And that has its specific political weight, even more it is considered that the issue of the social, economic, equality and social access is the main topic of Chavez.
By this we mean that the gap between the public agenda and policy agenda will cost dear to the opposition to Chavez, despite the errors, waste and mistakes you may commit the government is maintaining the social agenda as the main theme political agenda, making match his speech with almost 82% of voters in the D and E layers which comprise the country's election.
insist, under this scenario we can see three scenarios: 1) the opposition maintains that distancing discourse and if the Chavez get around 120-130 seats in the National Assembly, 2) democratization opposed the election of their candidates and waiving consensus as a way to make up their lists, but still not enough because without a political agenda, in this case Chavez gets between 90 and 110 seats and the opposition between 46 and 75 and the last stage (nearly impossible), is one where the not only democratically elected opposition candidates, the accompanying with a political agenda but also those candidates are not associated with the traditional players (as seen there are many variables to play) then and only then, the opposition can reach 76 to 90 seats putting Chavez in a minority. This latter scenario depends on strict compliance with all the variables, we see very difficult issue given the nature of the political situation. In conclusion, ductal who it hurts, Chavez is here to stay despite their mistakes.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero J. Historian

Juane1208@gmail.com
23/12/2009

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THE GREAT TURNING CRISIS TO SET ANTI-CHAVEZ

TURN THE ADJUSTMENT OF GREAT CRISIS OF ANTI-CHAVEZ

The announcements made by President Hugo Chavez on Sunday March 22, are suitable for comparative analysis of structural adjustment proposed by Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989. Both Chávez and CAP are undoubtedly charismatic leaders, with enormous popular appeal and were faced with socio-political situation in a context of crisis.
For CAP, 1989, was drawn under the shadow of overwhelming electoral victory that was achieved in December 1988, promising to send back to the Venezuelans to the time of the Venezuela Arabia. Achieved political hegemony it provided an opportunity for the setting-later known as the Washington Consensus-economic and institutional. The Chavez government, for its part must face the huge impact of the worst economic crisis experienced by the world-system, threatening to destroy us through their consequences. On the other hand, is coming off a major electoral victory in both the consultation in November 2008 as the referendum on the amendment in February 2009. Both leaders, as seen at the time had announced measures to adjust their high popularity, high electoral support and a solid political-institutional guarantees.
However, the dynamics of implementation makes the difference between the two. CAP prefers the option of setting violent, marked by an aggressive policy change and bureaucratic patronage relations that characterized the Venezuelan political system since its establishment as a representative democracy in 1958. The decision to follow exactly the recommendations would be made to "reduce the size of government, such as removal of subsidies, the release of fiscal and monetary control, openness to transnational capital, privatization of strategic enterprises, increased gasoline, fixed rate liberalization and active, would be the dominant feature of the government of AD leaders. His decision made some sense: it had a apparently strong base of popular support derived from their victory in the presidential election. His over-reliance on containment capabilities of its leadership, was his mistake. I never take into consideration that the construction of a framer process - understood as a dynamic transmission of values, attitudes and visions of life that motivate social groups to mobilize, to return to an idealized past and the non-fulfillment of that promise could lead to a cycle of protest and civil disobedience of the magnitudes of 27.28 and February 29, 1989. The arrogance of political elites in AD and COPEI who assumed as immutable truth that social groups were subjects submissive cost them their hegemony policy. The decision to apply once a set of structural adjustment programs was a mistake that remind Chávez is responsible for day to day.
Meanwhile, in a scenario more difficult than assumed by CAP in 1989, President Chavez has been a huge political smell sample, while noting that it can be dangerous not to advance in the short term some effective actions as respect to reducing public expenditure luxury. Chávez's action, say several things: 1) its ability to surprise the political opponent, 2) the power of political communication and 3) the decision to advance a progressive adjustment.
On the first point, most opposition political actors had left circular came the news that fit high-impact, as it had CAP. Actually the size of the recession resulting from the speculative nature of the world system did provide a set of decisions of great magnitude such as increased gasoline, setting financial and exchange restrictions, devaluation in order, from the perspective of those actors an extreme scenario adjustment that would open the way for a new round of protests. However, nobody expected that all decisions were so limited. Again, as it has in other times - including earlier this year when he decided include all elected offices in the proposed amendment, Chavez left his opponents speechless.
That sense of wonder, is connected to the 2nd question: political communication. Chavez announced that he would divulge Saturday when the measures in this communication and expectations generated a set of rumors that were strongly debated with all progressive measures: no tax adjustment is characterized by a devaluation, there was no increase in gasoline (although not be ruled out) reduced the estimated selling price of oil to $ 60 $ 40 (although he had reset to $ 50). Political communication strategy work and practically nullify the resistance and fears that purport to be suggested. We believe that the measures will be accompanied by other incremental adjustments, intended to control the bureaucracy and excessive government spending, but "for now" will not be disclosed. Finally, the 3rd aspect, is associated to political expediency. Chavez knows he can not advance violent settings, which should create the conditions to be accepted for this action and decided to keep social spending even at the cost of enormous financial and economic risk by publicly states across reduced production oil to just over 3,100,000 barrels a day, trying to thereby influence the recovery of oil prices. Finally, unlike CAP, Chavez understood that adjustments without political support violent generate cycles of violence that undermine the governance and political hegemony. Based on these aspects, made a political calculation that, although risky and inadequate given enough oxygen to try to survive the storm. We still have a lot to see and we will be attentive to their decisions.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
25/03/2009
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IN THE ANATOMY OF PSUV Zulia

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero / Historian

El Zulia is the primary federal entity for Venezuela, not only by the oil issue, including its political aggregate. A geographical area that shares a slice of the more than 2,200-mile border with Colombia and also brings together a significant voting population - about 2,082,916 registered voters, who represent nearly 15% of the country's electoral universe. Historically, the Zulia state has had an uneven performance in relation to the national country, the explanation of this fact must be viewed in a broader context of building a historical identity associated with the port city's past and assuming a differential anthropology. That differentiality mixed with the pride of identity has been a political weapon used by the opposition to Chavez in the region.
Chavismo has been a political force characterized by its dispersion in the state. Since its inception in 1997, formed a box of personal leadership that somehow still survive: the likes of Professor Mary Queipo an important activity at the University of Zulia, Silvestre Villalobos, Jorge Duran Centeno (current ambassador to Panama) are just some characterizations of the political personality. In general, even before the organization of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) could not speak of a well-structured in Zulia. Precisely this gap is what explains the low probability that had the late Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) to take political power.
The internal conflict reflect a weakness in the regional leadership of the forces of Chavez and let us see the problems of those who spoke Marxist theorists to refer to the need for a well-structured game. Following Antonio Gramsci, Chavez has not been able to become a hegemonic power bloc internal scattering. However, it should be pointed out that since 2006 the victory of Chavez in presidential elections has been observed an organizational effort that resulted in the formation of a proposal that tends to bring together the various political processes that develop in the region. The formation of the PSUV has matched the various trends that survive the initial Chavez: the military, which is represented in the figure Durán Centeno and military groups participating in the 1992 coup attempt, the left represented by historical characters as José Huerta, Emilio Chirico, Arnoldo Olivares and others who come from a militant and active participation in organizations that made opposition to the AD and COPEI forces in the region, the university embodied by figures like Maria Queipo, Mario Isea, Rodrigo Cabezas among others, who come from important student movement in the late 80's and 90 of the last century, and finally those sectors that were joining forces to Chavez from the link with Arias Cardenas, among which should be noted at the same Gian Carlo Di Martino.
These forces coexist with differences and dissimilar perspectives on the dynamics of building the party and how to articulate the people's power, but they agreed on the need to organize around the PSUV seeking thereby to build a historic bloc in the sense Gramsci's term, which allows them to be able to specify an option of the Bolivarian project progress in Zulia. Chavismo has progressed
- With ups and downs in regional electoral strength. In 2006, obtained a total of 724,254 votes, beating the candidate Manuel Rosales in his own field. That figure is significant the impact of personal leadership and charismatic Hugo Chávez, especially when compared to the votes obtained by Chavez in 2005 in elections to national parliament when through the Vee and got something more than MVR 350,000. However, the year 2007 reflects the structural and organizational weakness of the newly created PSUV as in the office of the constitutional reform referendum of December 2, obtained 472,462 votes in the choice of Block A and 467 958 in Block B, reducing its volume election. The effects of the referendum of 2-D felt in shaping the party's internal leadership. Figures such as Rodrigo Cabezas - Minister of Finance in due course, "Gian Carlo Di Martino (Mayor of Maracaibo), General Carlos Martínez Mendoza (President CORPOZULIA) started fighting over a space of power internally.
The outcome of this dispute was the triumph of Di Martino's candidacy for governor and displaced internally Rodrigo Cabezas, leading to his replacement as Vice-President of the PSUV in the Zulia-Falcon region. The results of the gubernatorial election in November 2008 and the subsequent defeat of the option Di Martino, reopened the ideological gap to internal party. Electorally, the Vice-President of the PSUV, Jackie Farias, has had to endure the presence of former mayor and discontent generated toward certain sectors, but at the same time you can not deny that succeeded in raising the party's vote to 658,724 votes. This electoral base, that fails to ratify an internal leadership, explains the dilemma that the PSUV is now: 1) restructuring its power base through new primary election or 2) is organized around the leadership Farias-Di Martino. Both options have risks: the 1st, can lead to internal schism, given the survival of individual differences in the game, but can create basis for a re-legitimization of popular organization, the 2nd option may end up increasing the existing fragmentation and some disorganization. Process
After November, the trend is favored Rodrigo Cabezas. The proximity to the mayors of Mara, Páez, Padilla, Cabimas, Columbus, San Francisco and other winners of the regional elections, keeps alive the figure of former Prime Minister and placed in a difficult internal situation the followers of Di Martino. There is no direct confrontation, but certainly in the internal forces are mobilized to resolve its political leadership in the party.
All that scenario, should be structured on the urgent need has the PSUV to build an information matrix as to minimize the media campaign built by Manuel Rosales and his advisers, where they have to embody the meaning and significance of Zulia. If the PSUV is not able to develop a discourse that identifies with the image regional political possibilities are reduced to a minimum and thus no internal differences will be ironed out. The recent dispute over port and airport of Maracaibo is a political opportunity to set the course for the future of the PSUV, if the party manages to survive and weakening regional sentiments Rosales in his leadership, we will see the emergence of a new political leadership strategy could allow Chavez forces take the city of Zulia, however everything is subject to actions of the PSUV and their ability to articulate coherently.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero historian, political analyst

Juane1208@gmail.com
20/03/2009

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Zulia, DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CASE ROSALES

Zulia, DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CASE ROSALES

I need to generate a debate about decentralization, especially given the circumstances that produced the change of the Decentralization Law and the decision to reverse the exclusive jurisdiction in ports, airports and roads that had been allocated to States and Municipalities initially. In a first step - especially for unfamiliar the historical process - the reversal is a "blow" to democracy. However it is necessary to explain certain things.
Historically, with the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, began a process of strengthening and centralization of state functions, explained by the excessive atomism Venezuela that characterized those years. The federal system implemented by Antonio Guzmán Blanco, who was the result and consequence of the Federal War was the reproduction of micro-centers of power in the regions, which established a precarious balance of power with the National Executive and in many cases, became part of a armed intervention in certain regions - Zulia including attempts to break the autonomy that threatened national unity.
Centralization of power was key to the modernization of the Venezuelan society. The establishment of a military government service and protection of the safety and defense of the Nation, the currency system made since the creation of the Central Bank of Venezuela in 1940, are just some examples of the effects of centralization. Finally, it should not ignored the role of political parties facilitated the centralization of power. All this enhanced by the use of oil revenues as the basis for financing the modernization process that allowed including raising the conditions of life of Venezuelans, the reduction of mortality rates and increasing life expectancy. This does not mean that centralism has not had problems, what we mean is that not everything was bad centralism.
Decentralization is the process whereby political power was transferred from the central government, state bodies near the town, endowed with administrative independence. The explanation of this process should be within the orbit of 1st generation reforms proposed by the liberal model, which suggested the mandatory reduction of central state and the gradual transfer of responsibilities to the authorities regional and local. The approach was simple: the Central State under the signs of the Washington Consensus had to take only the administration of the ownership, border security and protection of trade. Everything else was under the influence of the market, which had its own dynamics.
Decentralization resulted in a process of labor flexibility, through the privatization of the government, through the formation of employee organizations and workers who were responsible for the execution of maintenance works and limited the liability of the State Regional payment of benefits social. On the other hand the excesses of decentralization and the momentum generated in some locations to produce the emergence of local commanders in the purest sense nineteenth century-as happened in Carabobo (Salas Romer), Barinas, Sucre (Ramon Martinez), Aragua ( Tablante) came to high to afford the establishment of international agreements between the regional states and organizations or foreign countries. However, there were certainly advantages in the process, it allowed the emergence of a political debate in the Zulia was embodied by figures such as Luis Homez, which emerged as a champion of democracy against the abuses generated by decentralized regionalism.
The situation today is different. The dismantling of the state formula demonstrated against it and to live this process restrengthening National State has had its benefits: a social policy of the new center and engine of state action, recovery of international oil prices and thus increase funding. In the process, there has been a clash between the National Project developed and the actions of local and regional governments, although it has a democratic basis are obliged to fulfill the mandate of the social contract poured into the Constitution. In the case of Zulia, Manuel Rosales, have seen a dynamic handling of Zulia and an accelerated wastage of resources from the airport and the port that never appear reflected in the revenues and expenditures of the state, we do not doubt that these resources have been built works but with some of them have been generated that are necessary to remedy deviations . Finally, the decision to amend the Act is the product of the contradictions arising from Articles 156 and 164, which established the powers of the national and state groups. No doubt we need a debate, but not in terms of handling proposed by Manuel Rosales and Un Nuevo Tiempo. Dr. John E.

Historian
Romero
Juane1208@gmail.com
30/03/2009

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OBAMA AND CHAVEZ, U.S. AND VENEZUELA: THE CONFLICT CONTINUES

In another column we publish just celebrated the victory of Barak Obama, we indicated that we had high expectations of change in relation to the new U.S. president. The statement was made based on an understanding of the nature of the American political system that is structured like a great relationship with the capital generated by the powerful economic machine that drives the world system can not fail to link the stability and governance with the balance made up on the appropriation of the surplus produced by the dominant production relations.
American society, economic system, its bureaucratic and institutional, the state itself, conforms to a number of equilibria between forms of power, namely economic, political and ideological. Economic power is the one that uses the ownership of property and the ability to produce, market and distribute. Political power is that which is exercised through the force and its main political expression: the State. The great German scientist Max Weber defined it - with good reason, the state as the dominant and hegemonic structure in the use of force. Finally, the ideological power is based on the possession of certain forms of knowledge, doctrine, knowledge, and even information.
The U.S. economic power, has been built on the impact and the ability to produce goods of big capital owners and operators. Large companies, "the same is now affected by the speculative crisis of the world system, to significantly reduce the production of consumer goods and increasing financial speculation have pushed so the current president, so it have led to "intervene" in the development of the market, thereby seeking to safeguard the power relations that explain the U.S. hegemonic position. The large economic groups, that during the administration of George W. Bush had scored the process of setting up a geo-economic area through the Free Trade Area of \u200b\u200bthe Americas (FTAA), have seen with great concern the economic integration initiatives, social and military advanced through MERCOSUR, CAN and recently UNASUR. They all felt the imprint of the Chavez government, to hit most of the time and others with not so many, but always present.
The ideological and political power, has not undergone major changes in the U.S.. Obama's arrival is only a small opening in the ultra-conservative reform American society but never, not ever, can be seen as an alternative power in a political system that has remained virtually unchanged since its inception in the eighteenth century. Obama has articulated the factors of political power, has partnered with the most conservative radical right wing in the Republican Party, while he has managed to articulate a traditional power factors in the Democratic Party. Proof of this is the appointment of Hilary Clinton as Secretary of State.
Therefore, the prospects you have in the State Department on policy development in Venezuela are not encouraging, let alone with the results of the referendum of 15 February. The possibility - which has been open-Chávez of allowing not only to provide continuity but to deepen the socio-political settings called Simon Bolivar Project, with its relevant concepts in the social, economic, territorial, geopolitical source of concern to the interests expressed in the threads of the political and ideological power of the USA; therefore the nature and meaning of the Report on the Situation of Human Rights presented by the Secretary of State recently.
is remarkable lightness of the aforementioned report by noting the absence of significant criticisms of the human rights situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, Mexico, Colombia, Saudi Arabia and the USA itself, to name but a highly visible cases on the world . This is the continuation of a policy to present Venezuela as a rogue state that is in violation of the rules of public international law regulating and thus find a set of sanctions to produce a choking similar to that allowed intervention Iraq. The problem is given by the fact that the foreign policy of the Bolivarian Republic has been marked by the use of so-called oil diplomacy, which has allowed the non-lined shore of our country with U.S. interests in the region. The subject oil and oil nationalism is still inconvenient for the Obama administration, as it was for Bush, in that sense the structure relationship with President Chavez has no reason to improve, so the expectations created by some circles of intellectuals is mere speculation.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
02/03/2009

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RESULTS IN THE ZULIA: spots on policy

PSUV elections that defined the constitutional amendment must be analyzed in their individual results in Zulia state. To do this we must make clear some points: 1) analyzing the results from the referendum of 2007 to 2009, 2) the electoral processes are dissimilar and 3) should be established by the type of election and the nature of a special competition comparison between the referendum of 2007.
In analyzing the results from 2007 through 2009, what stands out is as Block A, the No and Yes 624,790 won 472,462, a difference of 13% together. Block B, 626,850 and got no Yes, 467,958. In this case the difference was 15%. This undoubtedly shows that the 1st Block of articles proposed by President Chavez was less than the 2nd block rejection proposed by the deputies in the National Assembly. In the elections of 2008, made on November 23 the candidate of Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) Pablo Perez earned a total score and the candidate de776.372 PSUV Gian Carlo Di Martino reached 658,724, a difference between 8%. In the referendum of 15 February, received 690,753 votes Yes and NO, triumphed again with 769,742, the difference was between 5.41%. That means several things. The 1st is that Chavez had a recovery in the state between 2007-2009 from slightly over 470,000 to almost 700,000 votes, yet there is an indication that signals a profound contradiction stems from the fact that despite being an oil state, related sectors where unions mobilized around the president's proposal, is still missing. That indicates that there is an ambiguity in the policy approach to the labor sector and the effectiveness social policy of PDVSA, PEQUIVEN and others should be reviewed thoroughly.
When we see the behavior in the so-called electoral corridor, comprising the municipalities with the highest voting population among whom it should be noted - in order from highest to lowest population-to Maracaibo, San Francisco, Cabimas, Lagunillas, Mara, Machiques, Columbus Paez, Jesus Enrique Lossada, Miranda and Rosario de Perija. Those municipalities meet approximately 73% of the actual vote in the region. Looking
some cases the outcome of the vote in individual municipalities is very visible the impact of assumptions about the inefficiency and disorganization of the forces PSUV Zulia. We say this while recognizing the organizational effort that was experienced in the last elections, but remains inadequate in relation to the capacity of mobilization and organization of UNT.
The Municipality of Maracaibo, in 2007 the average did not get one (Option A + Option B) of 285,000 votes while the Yes hit 169,000. A percentage difference of 25%. In November 2008, the nomination of Paul Perez managed in the municipality votes to 219 256 333 955 Di Martino. At the parish level lost in Bolivar, Cacique Mara, Carraciolo Parra, Cecilio Acosta, Chiquinquirá Coquivacoa, Christ Aranza, Juana de Avila, Manuel Dagnino, Olegario Villalobos Raúl Leoni and Santa Lucia. The PSUV won only Antonio Borjas, Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, Ildefonso Vasquez, Luis Hurtado and Venancio Pulgar. The paradox is that the PSUV profit percentage differences were very low (between 0.5% and 5%) while UNT ranged between 5% and 35%. It is illogical, as parishes and Bolivar, Raul Leoni, Chiquinquirá, Cacique Mara, Cecilio Acosta, Aranza Christ, are composed mostly located in areas D and E strata, where Chavez has traditionally had excellent results. How do you explain this? Without doubt, the result is the consequence of the kind of leadership and organizational capacity deployed to the area. There is no doubt that UNT has managed to win those areas, with a more effective welfare policy that was developed through national agencies. That should be a thorough review, which has not happened so far.
In 2008, the Maracaibo Municipality continued to express such behavior. The proportion remained the same parish in which the opposition triumphed in which Chavez won. There were other, some recovery in the number of votes, but remains positive about the strength of UNT. This is deeply contradictory, even more it is considered that the gubernatorial candidate for the PSUV came to meet two terms (8 years) Mayor in the municipality. In 2009, the difference marks the Maracaibo Municipality, for all parishes contributed 355,848 of the 769,000 total that won the NO in Zulia state. Numerically speaking to the state capital city, where they seat agencies and representatives of the National Executive which therefore should be more action Plan Simón Bolívar, generated almost 50% of the votes of resistance to the amendment. Certainly something is wrong in Guatemala. If the PSUV does not advance a policy of ideological formation and revision of your machine, run the risk that the Zulia key to become major political loss. Dr. John E.

Romero
25/02/2009
Juane1208@gmail.com
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AFTER FEBRUARY 15: SOME CONSIDERATIONS Past elections

plays serious analysis, both numerical and qualitative assessment of what happened. We should start focusing on the nature of political communication that we live in Venezuela. On this occasion, the sector that made use of fear as a strategy was the government. The advertisements that indicated the possibility of loss of social achievements and missions, the Mercal were very effective in achieving the mobilization of key constituencies in the Venezuelan process: social strata D and E.
The opposition could remove the argument that would end with the missions and Barrio Adentro modules. The experiences of what has been done so far by the governors of Táchira, Miranda and Carabobo are fresh in the memory of social groups and certainly responded to the message of the citizen president. Moreover, we have the impact of social time, ie the temporary space was opposed to respond to new elections. The huge costs incurred to finance the campaign of mayors and governors, left almost without resources to the opposition to Chavez. Moreover, the opposition failed to answer the call to customize the vow made by Chavez. It is understood that Chavez would vote for anti-Chávez Chávez and even voted for the president, or at least taking into account their aversion to Chavez. Without doubt, the personalization of the vote was favorable to Chavez.
The arguments raised by the No campaign were to put it decently futile, useless, but the best word they could use is stupid. The phrase is not NO, is of a simplicity that does not say anything and to the discourse of Chavez Chavez's departure would mean the loss of social achievements, the option left to voters of the layers D and E was clear: support for the president's proposal. But that does not mean that the mobilized sectors around Chavez administration officials and the structure of the PSUV not review their performance. Undoubtedly, there are still many spots to be cauterized, one of them the subject of bureaucracy, another uncertainty. Persist in the matrix that everything is fine as is, as the election results prove it would certainly be an idiot in the same mood of the theme of the opposition campaign. By the PSUV is an ethical obligation to go to improve the nature of the proceedings and the actual development of the state structure and the party. Can no longer postpone the process of ideological discussion of deliberation on the development of party officials.
It does insist on the revolutionary road to socialism without violence persecution should then insist on the processes of collective organization and the ideological debate aimed at the critical value and meaning. You can not overlook the fact that while Chavez recovered from the decline in its electoral between 2006 and 2007, when she went from 7,300,000 votes to 4,300,000 just to get 5,600,000 in 2008 and up to 3 months after 6,100,000, but also the opposition to this process succeeded in overcoming the barrier of the 4 million votes. Opposition to Chávez step of 4,200,000 in 2006 to 4,500,000 in 2007, then to 4,600,000 in 2008 and 5 million in 2009. Growth is low in relation with Chavez, but it is a fact that should be considered. When we analyze the scenario in Zulia, we call attention to the PSUV because even organizational weaknesses are noted however allows you to increase its electoral strength in the state, going from 541,000 to 690,000 votes, ie their strength increased by about 150,000 votes . For its part, the opposition to step away from getting 656,000 votes in November 2008 to 769,000 in 2009, that's an increase of 113,000 votes. Zulia remains
The oil stain on the hegemony of Chavez, that forces the PSUV to rethink their local and regional strategies. Maracaibo's case is an example: Chiquinquira popular parishes, Bolivar, St. Lucia are openly opposed to the choice of president, this indicates a better job of organizing and penetration by UNT in connection with work done by the PSUV. In parishes where Chavez has dominated as Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, San Isidro, Luís Hurtado advantage is not overwhelming. In sum the Zulia is a perfect case for the implementation of the 3Rs: review, rectify and relaunch. We'll see

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
17/02/2009

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AMENDMENTS, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

electoral process Venezuelans live Sunday February 15 have a set of meanings that alone explain the nature of political communication is handled through the options Yes and No.
In 1st place, the amendment itself involves a debate about two different ways of seeing the constitutional right. Of those who based elitist perspective consider that participation in the political debate be restricted to the mere election of officers and for whom the constitutional bodies should not be reformed, since the reform of the rule leads to lawlessness and conditions instability. Moreover, in the opposite are those within the New Latin American Constitutionalism (NCL) argue that popular sovereignty construction is a condition of citizenship and therefore should be extended to the maximum, at the same time feel that the Constitutions are imperfect structure and incomplete, subject to change. From one to another position, the distance is abysmal, both in their ideological underpinnings and political practice.
In 2nd place, the amendment reflects a discussion about the true meaning of popular sovereignty, understood as a space for expression of political will and its relationship to the theory of good government, which paradoxically is part of a theory arising from liberal thinking, particularly linked to the idea of \u200b\u200brepresentative government and effective management of the mandate.
In 3rd place, which was discussed in Venezuela on Sunday, is being proposed in Latin America and shows the impact of institutional change on the continent. This is a legal and political debate about the relevance of constitutional legal norms adjust to the accelerated process of change that is experienced in our societies. In the background is the question of how the right can think and incorporate the process of change in the rule of law.
In 4th place, obviously in these parameters previously established in the amendment results in a revision of the conditions of domination and subordination that characterize any system capitalist, and certainly the Venezuelan system typically maintains even exploitative and thus, the amendment becomes a risk to existing relations between capital and labor.
In 5th place, the amendment to support and promote the theory of good government, puts many sectors of the opposition to decide on whether to compete with a charismatic leadership and certainly has a high social impact, through a policy of revival of the rule of law. This is a huge disadvantage, even more so when one considers that the options Chavez lack a political program as an alternative to Simon Bolivar Project presents a vision for the country for the period 2001-2013.
These 5 elements combine through the field of political communication, understood as the close relationship between governor and governed as expressed through the intermediation of the mass media. Political communication in the election campaign has clearly identified two vectors: 1) the vector of the expansion of democracy and the exercise of good governance and 2) the vector of the illegitimacy of the amendment. On 1 of them has resulted in a propaganda insists that the benefits of management during 10 years of the Chavez government and the possibilities of broadening and deepening the Bolivarian project through the elimination of the restriction at times you can run an official exercise. The 2nd says that the illegitimacy of the amendment is part of a series of irregularities conducted by the Chavez government. Accompanying addition to the management of fear as a factor of restraint in political volunteerism triggered by public policies carried out by using the huge oil resources.
Political propaganda has stressed these two vectors ideas: good governance and illegitimacy-hazard of the amendment. The ads have moved through the use of images and audiovisual resources that seek to reinforce that perspective or representation frameworks of interpretation. It raised one side of continuity cultural con el desarrollo de una política de reforzamiento de la ciudadanía, pero por el otro lado se trata de plantear un choque cultural con las “aparentes” identidades ´políticas del venezolano. Esas estrategías tienen el mismo objetivo: lograr la mayor movilización de los electores. Los dos sectores en pugan, están conscientes de la proporcionalidad de sus fuerzas y buscan movilizarlas alcanzado la supremacía sobre el otro. Cualquiera que resulte ganador, lo será en un escenario con una abstención que rondará el 35% a 40%, esperemos el domingo a ver los resultados.

Dr. Juan E. Romero
Historiador
Juane1208@gmail.com
10/02/2009

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FEBRUARY TO FEBRUARY: HISTORICAL CHANGE IN VENEZUELA

FEBRUARY TO FEBRUARY: HISTORICAL CHANGE IN VENEZUELA

February has been in the history of Venezuela, a month of change, mobilization and conflict. In February 1936, occurs in the country a series of socio-political mobilizations which open the debate about civil rights and social change in the institutional development of the Venezuelan State.
In February, a set of forces and social movements are mobilized to demand a change of direction in shaping the institutions and the mobilization in response to President Eleazar López Contreras made public the so-called February Program, which can be considered the 1st Program modern politics in the country. There are incorporated themes that even today, almost 100 years later, are still under discussion and analysis by political actors: health, education, labor rights, respect for law, public works. Finally, elements of the policy agenda on which the media debate, the state and its institutions.
February 1936, creates the foundation for socio-political modernization and deepening the public debate. A little over half a century later, in February 1989, is generated in the country one of the strongest expressions of civil disobedience, when understood as a break and challenge the system of rules and regulations imposed by the state through the use of various methods, not always coercive. The social explosion in February 1989 was an expression of exhaustion of a model of corporate relations, where the factors of agglomerates in the structure of trade unions, business groups, political figures and others, refused to lose their privileges and progress in solving the problems of social exclusion and socio-economic imbalance. February 1989 was a dawn in what was to happen, but his footsteps were not heard.
In February 1992, namely a dynamic military and civilian article seeks political change through the use of arms. That action was a consequence the absence of alternative ways of resolving the conflict that had emerged consistently in February 1989. The civilian-military movement led by Hugo Chávez, while failure to achieve its military objectives, opened the way to an intense debate about the quality of democracy and governance conditions of the Venezuelan political system.
In February 1992, there was a rupture of the internal unit of the Venezuelan political elites. Rafael Caldera's speech in Congress was a sign of internal disagreements arising in the status quo of the democratic system. The positions of political actors as Aristobulus Izturiz, representing Radical Cause party, and the articulation of its approach to changing expectations of social groups was another clear demonstration of the exhaustion of the political settlement imposed since 1958.
Articulating enormous social, political and economic proposals of the military rebels in 1992, noted the real possibility of change in a program initially discussed and gradually expanded their view of Venezuelan society. In February 1999, reached after the election victory in December last year, President Hugo Chavez signed the decree in Council of Ministers convened a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) designed to reshape the political and institutional deeply. The formation of the Constituent Assembly and the subsequent drafting of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Constitution) began an unstoppable momentum that allowed for the reconfiguration of the State, which had been progressively dismantled under the logic of neoliberal adjustment.
changes driven by the decree of convocation, generated a political and constitutional debate of great importance about the possibilities for political society to bring about change in constitutional law, designed to respond to the change process. These changes promoted in February generated 2002 the violent expression of the sectors opposed to the dynamics of political change and ended with the events of April 2002. In February 2003, the unnatural alliance economic groups-workers (Fedecámaras-CTV) plunged the population in conditions of poverty and insecurity, will only social groups themselves could overcome. In February 2009, after 10 years of coming to power, initiating a new dynamic of institutional change that has its central theme Amendment.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
02/02/2009
Juane1208@gmail.com