IN THE ANATOMY OF PSUV Zulia
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero / Historian
El Zulia is the primary federal entity for Venezuela, not only by the oil issue, including its political aggregate. A geographical area that shares a slice of the more than 2,200-mile border with Colombia and also brings together a significant voting population - about 2,082,916 registered voters, who represent nearly 15% of the country's electoral universe. Historically, the Zulia state has had an uneven performance in relation to the national country, the explanation of this fact must be viewed in a broader context of building a historical identity associated with the port city's past and assuming a differential anthropology. That differentiality mixed with the pride of identity has been a political weapon used by the opposition to Chavez in the region.
Chavismo has been a political force characterized by its dispersion in the state. Since its inception in 1997, formed a box of personal leadership that somehow still survive: the likes of Professor Mary Queipo an important activity at the University of Zulia, Silvestre Villalobos, Jorge Duran Centeno (current ambassador to Panama) are just some characterizations of the political personality. In general, even before the organization of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) could not speak of a well-structured in Zulia. Precisely this gap is what explains the low probability that had the late Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) to take political power.
The internal conflict reflect a weakness in the regional leadership of the forces of Chavez and let us see the problems of those who spoke Marxist theorists to refer to the need for a well-structured game. Following Antonio Gramsci, Chavez has not been able to become a hegemonic power bloc internal scattering. However, it should be pointed out that since 2006 the victory of Chavez in presidential elections has been observed an organizational effort that resulted in the formation of a proposal that tends to bring together the various political processes that develop in the region. The formation of the PSUV has matched the various trends that survive the initial Chavez: the military, which is represented in the figure Durán Centeno and military groups participating in the 1992 coup attempt, the left represented by historical characters as José Huerta, Emilio Chirico, Arnoldo Olivares and others who come from a militant and active participation in organizations that made opposition to the AD and COPEI forces in the region, the university embodied by figures like Maria Queipo, Mario Isea, Rodrigo Cabezas among others, who come from important student movement in the late 80's and 90 of the last century, and finally those sectors that were joining forces to Chavez from the link with Arias Cardenas, among which should be noted at the same Gian Carlo Di Martino.
These forces coexist with differences and dissimilar perspectives on the dynamics of building the party and how to articulate the people's power, but they agreed on the need to organize around the PSUV seeking thereby to build a historic bloc in the sense Gramsci's term, which allows them to be able to specify an option of the Bolivarian project progress in Zulia. Chavismo has progressed
- With ups and downs in regional electoral strength. In 2006, obtained a total of 724,254 votes, beating the candidate Manuel Rosales in his own field. That figure is significant the impact of personal leadership and charismatic Hugo Chávez, especially when compared to the votes obtained by Chavez in 2005 in elections to national parliament when through the Vee and got something more than MVR 350,000. However, the year 2007 reflects the structural and organizational weakness of the newly created PSUV as in the office of the constitutional reform referendum of December 2, obtained 472,462 votes in the choice of Block A and 467 958 in Block B, reducing its volume election. The effects of the referendum of 2-D felt in shaping the party's internal leadership. Figures such as Rodrigo Cabezas - Minister of Finance in due course, "Gian Carlo Di Martino (Mayor of Maracaibo), General Carlos Martínez Mendoza (President CORPOZULIA) started fighting over a space of power internally.
The outcome of this dispute was the triumph of Di Martino's candidacy for governor and displaced internally Rodrigo Cabezas, leading to his replacement as Vice-President of the PSUV in the Zulia-Falcon region. The results of the gubernatorial election in November 2008 and the subsequent defeat of the option Di Martino, reopened the ideological gap to internal party. Electorally, the Vice-President of the PSUV, Jackie Farias, has had to endure the presence of former mayor and discontent generated toward certain sectors, but at the same time you can not deny that succeeded in raising the party's vote to 658,724 votes. This electoral base, that fails to ratify an internal leadership, explains the dilemma that the PSUV is now: 1) restructuring its power base through new primary election or 2) is organized around the leadership Farias-Di Martino. Both options have risks: the 1st, can lead to internal schism, given the survival of individual differences in the game, but can create basis for a re-legitimization of popular organization, the 2nd option may end up increasing the existing fragmentation and some disorganization. Process
After November, the trend is favored Rodrigo Cabezas. The proximity to the mayors of Mara, Páez, Padilla, Cabimas, Columbus, San Francisco and other winners of the regional elections, keeps alive the figure of former Prime Minister and placed in a difficult internal situation the followers of Di Martino. There is no direct confrontation, but certainly in the internal forces are mobilized to resolve its political leadership in the party.
All that scenario, should be structured on the urgent need has the PSUV to build an information matrix as to minimize the media campaign built by Manuel Rosales and his advisers, where they have to embody the meaning and significance of Zulia. If the PSUV is not able to develop a discourse that identifies with the image regional political possibilities are reduced to a minimum and thus no internal differences will be ironed out. The recent dispute over port and airport of Maracaibo is a political opportunity to set the course for the future of the PSUV, if the party manages to survive and weakening regional sentiments Rosales in his leadership, we will see the emergence of a new political leadership strategy could allow Chavez forces take the city of Zulia, however everything is subject to actions of the PSUV and their ability to articulate coherently.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero historian, political analyst
Juane1208@gmail.com
20/03/2009
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