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THE GREAT TURNING CRISIS TO SET ANTI-CHAVEZ

TURN THE ADJUSTMENT OF GREAT CRISIS OF ANTI-CHAVEZ

The announcements made by President Hugo Chavez on Sunday March 22, are suitable for comparative analysis of structural adjustment proposed by Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989. Both Chávez and CAP are undoubtedly charismatic leaders, with enormous popular appeal and were faced with socio-political situation in a context of crisis.
For CAP, 1989, was drawn under the shadow of overwhelming electoral victory that was achieved in December 1988, promising to send back to the Venezuelans to the time of the Venezuela Arabia. Achieved political hegemony it provided an opportunity for the setting-later known as the Washington Consensus-economic and institutional. The Chavez government, for its part must face the huge impact of the worst economic crisis experienced by the world-system, threatening to destroy us through their consequences. On the other hand, is coming off a major electoral victory in both the consultation in November 2008 as the referendum on the amendment in February 2009. Both leaders, as seen at the time had announced measures to adjust their high popularity, high electoral support and a solid political-institutional guarantees.
However, the dynamics of implementation makes the difference between the two. CAP prefers the option of setting violent, marked by an aggressive policy change and bureaucratic patronage relations that characterized the Venezuelan political system since its establishment as a representative democracy in 1958. The decision to follow exactly the recommendations would be made to "reduce the size of government, such as removal of subsidies, the release of fiscal and monetary control, openness to transnational capital, privatization of strategic enterprises, increased gasoline, fixed rate liberalization and active, would be the dominant feature of the government of AD leaders. His decision made some sense: it had a apparently strong base of popular support derived from their victory in the presidential election. His over-reliance on containment capabilities of its leadership, was his mistake. I never take into consideration that the construction of a framer process - understood as a dynamic transmission of values, attitudes and visions of life that motivate social groups to mobilize, to return to an idealized past and the non-fulfillment of that promise could lead to a cycle of protest and civil disobedience of the magnitudes of 27.28 and February 29, 1989. The arrogance of political elites in AD and COPEI who assumed as immutable truth that social groups were subjects submissive cost them their hegemony policy. The decision to apply once a set of structural adjustment programs was a mistake that remind Chávez is responsible for day to day.
Meanwhile, in a scenario more difficult than assumed by CAP in 1989, President Chavez has been a huge political smell sample, while noting that it can be dangerous not to advance in the short term some effective actions as respect to reducing public expenditure luxury. Chávez's action, say several things: 1) its ability to surprise the political opponent, 2) the power of political communication and 3) the decision to advance a progressive adjustment.
On the first point, most opposition political actors had left circular came the news that fit high-impact, as it had CAP. Actually the size of the recession resulting from the speculative nature of the world system did provide a set of decisions of great magnitude such as increased gasoline, setting financial and exchange restrictions, devaluation in order, from the perspective of those actors an extreme scenario adjustment that would open the way for a new round of protests. However, nobody expected that all decisions were so limited. Again, as it has in other times - including earlier this year when he decided include all elected offices in the proposed amendment, Chavez left his opponents speechless.
That sense of wonder, is connected to the 2nd question: political communication. Chavez announced that he would divulge Saturday when the measures in this communication and expectations generated a set of rumors that were strongly debated with all progressive measures: no tax adjustment is characterized by a devaluation, there was no increase in gasoline (although not be ruled out) reduced the estimated selling price of oil to $ 60 $ 40 (although he had reset to $ 50). Political communication strategy work and practically nullify the resistance and fears that purport to be suggested. We believe that the measures will be accompanied by other incremental adjustments, intended to control the bureaucracy and excessive government spending, but "for now" will not be disclosed. Finally, the 3rd aspect, is associated to political expediency. Chavez knows he can not advance violent settings, which should create the conditions to be accepted for this action and decided to keep social spending even at the cost of enormous financial and economic risk by publicly states across reduced production oil to just over 3,100,000 barrels a day, trying to thereby influence the recovery of oil prices. Finally, unlike CAP, Chavez understood that adjustments without political support violent generate cycles of violence that undermine the governance and political hegemony. Based on these aspects, made a political calculation that, although risky and inadequate given enough oxygen to try to survive the storm. We still have a lot to see and we will be attentive to their decisions.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
25/03/2009
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IN THE ANATOMY OF PSUV Zulia

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero / Historian

El Zulia is the primary federal entity for Venezuela, not only by the oil issue, including its political aggregate. A geographical area that shares a slice of the more than 2,200-mile border with Colombia and also brings together a significant voting population - about 2,082,916 registered voters, who represent nearly 15% of the country's electoral universe. Historically, the Zulia state has had an uneven performance in relation to the national country, the explanation of this fact must be viewed in a broader context of building a historical identity associated with the port city's past and assuming a differential anthropology. That differentiality mixed with the pride of identity has been a political weapon used by the opposition to Chavez in the region.
Chavismo has been a political force characterized by its dispersion in the state. Since its inception in 1997, formed a box of personal leadership that somehow still survive: the likes of Professor Mary Queipo an important activity at the University of Zulia, Silvestre Villalobos, Jorge Duran Centeno (current ambassador to Panama) are just some characterizations of the political personality. In general, even before the organization of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) could not speak of a well-structured in Zulia. Precisely this gap is what explains the low probability that had the late Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) to take political power.
The internal conflict reflect a weakness in the regional leadership of the forces of Chavez and let us see the problems of those who spoke Marxist theorists to refer to the need for a well-structured game. Following Antonio Gramsci, Chavez has not been able to become a hegemonic power bloc internal scattering. However, it should be pointed out that since 2006 the victory of Chavez in presidential elections has been observed an organizational effort that resulted in the formation of a proposal that tends to bring together the various political processes that develop in the region. The formation of the PSUV has matched the various trends that survive the initial Chavez: the military, which is represented in the figure Durán Centeno and military groups participating in the 1992 coup attempt, the left represented by historical characters as José Huerta, Emilio Chirico, Arnoldo Olivares and others who come from a militant and active participation in organizations that made opposition to the AD and COPEI forces in the region, the university embodied by figures like Maria Queipo, Mario Isea, Rodrigo Cabezas among others, who come from important student movement in the late 80's and 90 of the last century, and finally those sectors that were joining forces to Chavez from the link with Arias Cardenas, among which should be noted at the same Gian Carlo Di Martino.
These forces coexist with differences and dissimilar perspectives on the dynamics of building the party and how to articulate the people's power, but they agreed on the need to organize around the PSUV seeking thereby to build a historic bloc in the sense Gramsci's term, which allows them to be able to specify an option of the Bolivarian project progress in Zulia. Chavismo has progressed
- With ups and downs in regional electoral strength. In 2006, obtained a total of 724,254 votes, beating the candidate Manuel Rosales in his own field. That figure is significant the impact of personal leadership and charismatic Hugo Chávez, especially when compared to the votes obtained by Chavez in 2005 in elections to national parliament when through the Vee and got something more than MVR 350,000. However, the year 2007 reflects the structural and organizational weakness of the newly created PSUV as in the office of the constitutional reform referendum of December 2, obtained 472,462 votes in the choice of Block A and 467 958 in Block B, reducing its volume election. The effects of the referendum of 2-D felt in shaping the party's internal leadership. Figures such as Rodrigo Cabezas - Minister of Finance in due course, "Gian Carlo Di Martino (Mayor of Maracaibo), General Carlos Martínez Mendoza (President CORPOZULIA) started fighting over a space of power internally.
The outcome of this dispute was the triumph of Di Martino's candidacy for governor and displaced internally Rodrigo Cabezas, leading to his replacement as Vice-President of the PSUV in the Zulia-Falcon region. The results of the gubernatorial election in November 2008 and the subsequent defeat of the option Di Martino, reopened the ideological gap to internal party. Electorally, the Vice-President of the PSUV, Jackie Farias, has had to endure the presence of former mayor and discontent generated toward certain sectors, but at the same time you can not deny that succeeded in raising the party's vote to 658,724 votes. This electoral base, that fails to ratify an internal leadership, explains the dilemma that the PSUV is now: 1) restructuring its power base through new primary election or 2) is organized around the leadership Farias-Di Martino. Both options have risks: the 1st, can lead to internal schism, given the survival of individual differences in the game, but can create basis for a re-legitimization of popular organization, the 2nd option may end up increasing the existing fragmentation and some disorganization. Process
After November, the trend is favored Rodrigo Cabezas. The proximity to the mayors of Mara, Páez, Padilla, Cabimas, Columbus, San Francisco and other winners of the regional elections, keeps alive the figure of former Prime Minister and placed in a difficult internal situation the followers of Di Martino. There is no direct confrontation, but certainly in the internal forces are mobilized to resolve its political leadership in the party.
All that scenario, should be structured on the urgent need has the PSUV to build an information matrix as to minimize the media campaign built by Manuel Rosales and his advisers, where they have to embody the meaning and significance of Zulia. If the PSUV is not able to develop a discourse that identifies with the image regional political possibilities are reduced to a minimum and thus no internal differences will be ironed out. The recent dispute over port and airport of Maracaibo is a political opportunity to set the course for the future of the PSUV, if the party manages to survive and weakening regional sentiments Rosales in his leadership, we will see the emergence of a new political leadership strategy could allow Chavez forces take the city of Zulia, however everything is subject to actions of the PSUV and their ability to articulate coherently.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero historian, political analyst

Juane1208@gmail.com
20/03/2009

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Zulia, DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CASE ROSALES

Zulia, DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CASE ROSALES

I need to generate a debate about decentralization, especially given the circumstances that produced the change of the Decentralization Law and the decision to reverse the exclusive jurisdiction in ports, airports and roads that had been allocated to States and Municipalities initially. In a first step - especially for unfamiliar the historical process - the reversal is a "blow" to democracy. However it is necessary to explain certain things.
Historically, with the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, began a process of strengthening and centralization of state functions, explained by the excessive atomism Venezuela that characterized those years. The federal system implemented by Antonio Guzmán Blanco, who was the result and consequence of the Federal War was the reproduction of micro-centers of power in the regions, which established a precarious balance of power with the National Executive and in many cases, became part of a armed intervention in certain regions - Zulia including attempts to break the autonomy that threatened national unity.
Centralization of power was key to the modernization of the Venezuelan society. The establishment of a military government service and protection of the safety and defense of the Nation, the currency system made since the creation of the Central Bank of Venezuela in 1940, are just some examples of the effects of centralization. Finally, it should not ignored the role of political parties facilitated the centralization of power. All this enhanced by the use of oil revenues as the basis for financing the modernization process that allowed including raising the conditions of life of Venezuelans, the reduction of mortality rates and increasing life expectancy. This does not mean that centralism has not had problems, what we mean is that not everything was bad centralism.
Decentralization is the process whereby political power was transferred from the central government, state bodies near the town, endowed with administrative independence. The explanation of this process should be within the orbit of 1st generation reforms proposed by the liberal model, which suggested the mandatory reduction of central state and the gradual transfer of responsibilities to the authorities regional and local. The approach was simple: the Central State under the signs of the Washington Consensus had to take only the administration of the ownership, border security and protection of trade. Everything else was under the influence of the market, which had its own dynamics.
Decentralization resulted in a process of labor flexibility, through the privatization of the government, through the formation of employee organizations and workers who were responsible for the execution of maintenance works and limited the liability of the State Regional payment of benefits social. On the other hand the excesses of decentralization and the momentum generated in some locations to produce the emergence of local commanders in the purest sense nineteenth century-as happened in Carabobo (Salas Romer), Barinas, Sucre (Ramon Martinez), Aragua ( Tablante) came to high to afford the establishment of international agreements between the regional states and organizations or foreign countries. However, there were certainly advantages in the process, it allowed the emergence of a political debate in the Zulia was embodied by figures such as Luis Homez, which emerged as a champion of democracy against the abuses generated by decentralized regionalism.
The situation today is different. The dismantling of the state formula demonstrated against it and to live this process restrengthening National State has had its benefits: a social policy of the new center and engine of state action, recovery of international oil prices and thus increase funding. In the process, there has been a clash between the National Project developed and the actions of local and regional governments, although it has a democratic basis are obliged to fulfill the mandate of the social contract poured into the Constitution. In the case of Zulia, Manuel Rosales, have seen a dynamic handling of Zulia and an accelerated wastage of resources from the airport and the port that never appear reflected in the revenues and expenditures of the state, we do not doubt that these resources have been built works but with some of them have been generated that are necessary to remedy deviations . Finally, the decision to amend the Act is the product of the contradictions arising from Articles 156 and 164, which established the powers of the national and state groups. No doubt we need a debate, but not in terms of handling proposed by Manuel Rosales and Un Nuevo Tiempo. Dr. John E.

Historian
Romero
Juane1208@gmail.com
30/03/2009