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OBAMA AND CHAVEZ, U.S. AND VENEZUELA: THE CONFLICT CONTINUES

In another column we publish just celebrated the victory of Barak Obama, we indicated that we had high expectations of change in relation to the new U.S. president. The statement was made based on an understanding of the nature of the American political system that is structured like a great relationship with the capital generated by the powerful economic machine that drives the world system can not fail to link the stability and governance with the balance made up on the appropriation of the surplus produced by the dominant production relations.
American society, economic system, its bureaucratic and institutional, the state itself, conforms to a number of equilibria between forms of power, namely economic, political and ideological. Economic power is the one that uses the ownership of property and the ability to produce, market and distribute. Political power is that which is exercised through the force and its main political expression: the State. The great German scientist Max Weber defined it - with good reason, the state as the dominant and hegemonic structure in the use of force. Finally, the ideological power is based on the possession of certain forms of knowledge, doctrine, knowledge, and even information.
The U.S. economic power, has been built on the impact and the ability to produce goods of big capital owners and operators. Large companies, "the same is now affected by the speculative crisis of the world system, to significantly reduce the production of consumer goods and increasing financial speculation have pushed so the current president, so it have led to "intervene" in the development of the market, thereby seeking to safeguard the power relations that explain the U.S. hegemonic position. The large economic groups, that during the administration of George W. Bush had scored the process of setting up a geo-economic area through the Free Trade Area of \u200b\u200bthe Americas (FTAA), have seen with great concern the economic integration initiatives, social and military advanced through MERCOSUR, CAN and recently UNASUR. They all felt the imprint of the Chavez government, to hit most of the time and others with not so many, but always present.
The ideological and political power, has not undergone major changes in the U.S.. Obama's arrival is only a small opening in the ultra-conservative reform American society but never, not ever, can be seen as an alternative power in a political system that has remained virtually unchanged since its inception in the eighteenth century. Obama has articulated the factors of political power, has partnered with the most conservative radical right wing in the Republican Party, while he has managed to articulate a traditional power factors in the Democratic Party. Proof of this is the appointment of Hilary Clinton as Secretary of State.
Therefore, the prospects you have in the State Department on policy development in Venezuela are not encouraging, let alone with the results of the referendum of 15 February. The possibility - which has been open-Chávez of allowing not only to provide continuity but to deepen the socio-political settings called Simon Bolivar Project, with its relevant concepts in the social, economic, territorial, geopolitical source of concern to the interests expressed in the threads of the political and ideological power of the USA; therefore the nature and meaning of the Report on the Situation of Human Rights presented by the Secretary of State recently.
is remarkable lightness of the aforementioned report by noting the absence of significant criticisms of the human rights situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, Mexico, Colombia, Saudi Arabia and the USA itself, to name but a highly visible cases on the world . This is the continuation of a policy to present Venezuela as a rogue state that is in violation of the rules of public international law regulating and thus find a set of sanctions to produce a choking similar to that allowed intervention Iraq. The problem is given by the fact that the foreign policy of the Bolivarian Republic has been marked by the use of so-called oil diplomacy, which has allowed the non-lined shore of our country with U.S. interests in the region. The subject oil and oil nationalism is still inconvenient for the Obama administration, as it was for Bush, in that sense the structure relationship with President Chavez has no reason to improve, so the expectations created by some circles of intellectuals is mere speculation.

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
02/03/2009

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RESULTS IN THE ZULIA: spots on policy

PSUV elections that defined the constitutional amendment must be analyzed in their individual results in Zulia state. To do this we must make clear some points: 1) analyzing the results from the referendum of 2007 to 2009, 2) the electoral processes are dissimilar and 3) should be established by the type of election and the nature of a special competition comparison between the referendum of 2007.
In analyzing the results from 2007 through 2009, what stands out is as Block A, the No and Yes 624,790 won 472,462, a difference of 13% together. Block B, 626,850 and got no Yes, 467,958. In this case the difference was 15%. This undoubtedly shows that the 1st Block of articles proposed by President Chavez was less than the 2nd block rejection proposed by the deputies in the National Assembly. In the elections of 2008, made on November 23 the candidate of Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) Pablo Perez earned a total score and the candidate de776.372 PSUV Gian Carlo Di Martino reached 658,724, a difference between 8%. In the referendum of 15 February, received 690,753 votes Yes and NO, triumphed again with 769,742, the difference was between 5.41%. That means several things. The 1st is that Chavez had a recovery in the state between 2007-2009 from slightly over 470,000 to almost 700,000 votes, yet there is an indication that signals a profound contradiction stems from the fact that despite being an oil state, related sectors where unions mobilized around the president's proposal, is still missing. That indicates that there is an ambiguity in the policy approach to the labor sector and the effectiveness social policy of PDVSA, PEQUIVEN and others should be reviewed thoroughly.
When we see the behavior in the so-called electoral corridor, comprising the municipalities with the highest voting population among whom it should be noted - in order from highest to lowest population-to Maracaibo, San Francisco, Cabimas, Lagunillas, Mara, Machiques, Columbus Paez, Jesus Enrique Lossada, Miranda and Rosario de Perija. Those municipalities meet approximately 73% of the actual vote in the region. Looking
some cases the outcome of the vote in individual municipalities is very visible the impact of assumptions about the inefficiency and disorganization of the forces PSUV Zulia. We say this while recognizing the organizational effort that was experienced in the last elections, but remains inadequate in relation to the capacity of mobilization and organization of UNT.
The Municipality of Maracaibo, in 2007 the average did not get one (Option A + Option B) of 285,000 votes while the Yes hit 169,000. A percentage difference of 25%. In November 2008, the nomination of Paul Perez managed in the municipality votes to 219 256 333 955 Di Martino. At the parish level lost in Bolivar, Cacique Mara, Carraciolo Parra, Cecilio Acosta, Chiquinquirá Coquivacoa, Christ Aranza, Juana de Avila, Manuel Dagnino, Olegario Villalobos Raúl Leoni and Santa Lucia. The PSUV won only Antonio Borjas, Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, Ildefonso Vasquez, Luis Hurtado and Venancio Pulgar. The paradox is that the PSUV profit percentage differences were very low (between 0.5% and 5%) while UNT ranged between 5% and 35%. It is illogical, as parishes and Bolivar, Raul Leoni, Chiquinquirá, Cacique Mara, Cecilio Acosta, Aranza Christ, are composed mostly located in areas D and E strata, where Chavez has traditionally had excellent results. How do you explain this? Without doubt, the result is the consequence of the kind of leadership and organizational capacity deployed to the area. There is no doubt that UNT has managed to win those areas, with a more effective welfare policy that was developed through national agencies. That should be a thorough review, which has not happened so far.
In 2008, the Maracaibo Municipality continued to express such behavior. The proportion remained the same parish in which the opposition triumphed in which Chavez won. There were other, some recovery in the number of votes, but remains positive about the strength of UNT. This is deeply contradictory, even more it is considered that the gubernatorial candidate for the PSUV came to meet two terms (8 years) Mayor in the municipality. In 2009, the difference marks the Maracaibo Municipality, for all parishes contributed 355,848 of the 769,000 total that won the NO in Zulia state. Numerically speaking to the state capital city, where they seat agencies and representatives of the National Executive which therefore should be more action Plan Simón Bolívar, generated almost 50% of the votes of resistance to the amendment. Certainly something is wrong in Guatemala. If the PSUV does not advance a policy of ideological formation and revision of your machine, run the risk that the Zulia key to become major political loss. Dr. John E.

Romero
25/02/2009
Juane1208@gmail.com
historian

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AFTER FEBRUARY 15: SOME CONSIDERATIONS Past elections

plays serious analysis, both numerical and qualitative assessment of what happened. We should start focusing on the nature of political communication that we live in Venezuela. On this occasion, the sector that made use of fear as a strategy was the government. The advertisements that indicated the possibility of loss of social achievements and missions, the Mercal were very effective in achieving the mobilization of key constituencies in the Venezuelan process: social strata D and E.
The opposition could remove the argument that would end with the missions and Barrio Adentro modules. The experiences of what has been done so far by the governors of Táchira, Miranda and Carabobo are fresh in the memory of social groups and certainly responded to the message of the citizen president. Moreover, we have the impact of social time, ie the temporary space was opposed to respond to new elections. The huge costs incurred to finance the campaign of mayors and governors, left almost without resources to the opposition to Chavez. Moreover, the opposition failed to answer the call to customize the vow made by Chavez. It is understood that Chavez would vote for anti-Chávez Chávez and even voted for the president, or at least taking into account their aversion to Chavez. Without doubt, the personalization of the vote was favorable to Chavez.
The arguments raised by the No campaign were to put it decently futile, useless, but the best word they could use is stupid. The phrase is not NO, is of a simplicity that does not say anything and to the discourse of Chavez Chavez's departure would mean the loss of social achievements, the option left to voters of the layers D and E was clear: support for the president's proposal. But that does not mean that the mobilized sectors around Chavez administration officials and the structure of the PSUV not review their performance. Undoubtedly, there are still many spots to be cauterized, one of them the subject of bureaucracy, another uncertainty. Persist in the matrix that everything is fine as is, as the election results prove it would certainly be an idiot in the same mood of the theme of the opposition campaign. By the PSUV is an ethical obligation to go to improve the nature of the proceedings and the actual development of the state structure and the party. Can no longer postpone the process of ideological discussion of deliberation on the development of party officials.
It does insist on the revolutionary road to socialism without violence persecution should then insist on the processes of collective organization and the ideological debate aimed at the critical value and meaning. You can not overlook the fact that while Chavez recovered from the decline in its electoral between 2006 and 2007, when she went from 7,300,000 votes to 4,300,000 just to get 5,600,000 in 2008 and up to 3 months after 6,100,000, but also the opposition to this process succeeded in overcoming the barrier of the 4 million votes. Opposition to Chávez step of 4,200,000 in 2006 to 4,500,000 in 2007, then to 4,600,000 in 2008 and 5 million in 2009. Growth is low in relation with Chavez, but it is a fact that should be considered. When we analyze the scenario in Zulia, we call attention to the PSUV because even organizational weaknesses are noted however allows you to increase its electoral strength in the state, going from 541,000 to 690,000 votes, ie their strength increased by about 150,000 votes . For its part, the opposition to step away from getting 656,000 votes in November 2008 to 769,000 in 2009, that's an increase of 113,000 votes. Zulia remains
The oil stain on the hegemony of Chavez, that forces the PSUV to rethink their local and regional strategies. Maracaibo's case is an example: Chiquinquira popular parishes, Bolivar, St. Lucia are openly opposed to the choice of president, this indicates a better job of organizing and penetration by UNT in connection with work done by the PSUV. In parishes where Chavez has dominated as Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, San Isidro, Luís Hurtado advantage is not overwhelming. In sum the Zulia is a perfect case for the implementation of the 3Rs: review, rectify and relaunch. We'll see

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
17/02/2009

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AMENDMENTS, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

electoral process Venezuelans live Sunday February 15 have a set of meanings that alone explain the nature of political communication is handled through the options Yes and No.
In 1st place, the amendment itself involves a debate about two different ways of seeing the constitutional right. Of those who based elitist perspective consider that participation in the political debate be restricted to the mere election of officers and for whom the constitutional bodies should not be reformed, since the reform of the rule leads to lawlessness and conditions instability. Moreover, in the opposite are those within the New Latin American Constitutionalism (NCL) argue that popular sovereignty construction is a condition of citizenship and therefore should be extended to the maximum, at the same time feel that the Constitutions are imperfect structure and incomplete, subject to change. From one to another position, the distance is abysmal, both in their ideological underpinnings and political practice.
In 2nd place, the amendment reflects a discussion about the true meaning of popular sovereignty, understood as a space for expression of political will and its relationship to the theory of good government, which paradoxically is part of a theory arising from liberal thinking, particularly linked to the idea of \u200b\u200brepresentative government and effective management of the mandate.
In 3rd place, which was discussed in Venezuela on Sunday, is being proposed in Latin America and shows the impact of institutional change on the continent. This is a legal and political debate about the relevance of constitutional legal norms adjust to the accelerated process of change that is experienced in our societies. In the background is the question of how the right can think and incorporate the process of change in the rule of law.
In 4th place, obviously in these parameters previously established in the amendment results in a revision of the conditions of domination and subordination that characterize any system capitalist, and certainly the Venezuelan system typically maintains even exploitative and thus, the amendment becomes a risk to existing relations between capital and labor.
In 5th place, the amendment to support and promote the theory of good government, puts many sectors of the opposition to decide on whether to compete with a charismatic leadership and certainly has a high social impact, through a policy of revival of the rule of law. This is a huge disadvantage, even more so when one considers that the options Chavez lack a political program as an alternative to Simon Bolivar Project presents a vision for the country for the period 2001-2013.
These 5 elements combine through the field of political communication, understood as the close relationship between governor and governed as expressed through the intermediation of the mass media. Political communication in the election campaign has clearly identified two vectors: 1) the vector of the expansion of democracy and the exercise of good governance and 2) the vector of the illegitimacy of the amendment. On 1 of them has resulted in a propaganda insists that the benefits of management during 10 years of the Chavez government and the possibilities of broadening and deepening the Bolivarian project through the elimination of the restriction at times you can run an official exercise. The 2nd says that the illegitimacy of the amendment is part of a series of irregularities conducted by the Chavez government. Accompanying addition to the management of fear as a factor of restraint in political volunteerism triggered by public policies carried out by using the huge oil resources.
Political propaganda has stressed these two vectors ideas: good governance and illegitimacy-hazard of the amendment. The ads have moved through the use of images and audiovisual resources that seek to reinforce that perspective or representation frameworks of interpretation. It raised one side of continuity cultural con el desarrollo de una política de reforzamiento de la ciudadanía, pero por el otro lado se trata de plantear un choque cultural con las “aparentes” identidades ´políticas del venezolano. Esas estrategías tienen el mismo objetivo: lograr la mayor movilización de los electores. Los dos sectores en pugan, están conscientes de la proporcionalidad de sus fuerzas y buscan movilizarlas alcanzado la supremacía sobre el otro. Cualquiera que resulte ganador, lo será en un escenario con una abstención que rondará el 35% a 40%, esperemos el domingo a ver los resultados.

Dr. Juan E. Romero
Historiador
Juane1208@gmail.com
10/02/2009